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Lands play a central role in the culture, customs, religion, health and subsistence of 
indigenous peoples and, ultimately, in their collective survival as distinct peoples.1 Indigenous 
peoples2 live in harmony with nature and care about the ecological integrity of their 
territories.3 
For indigenous peoples, lands, territories, and resources do not represent a mere source 
of livelihood. Indigenous peoples possess a unique, profound spiritual and material 
relationship with their ancestral lands. This relationship is collective and intergenerational.4  
Paradoxically, lands also are a crucial factor in human rights violations with which 
indigenous peoples are faced. As a result of colonisation, indigenous peoples have endured 
grave historical injustices, including cultural assimilation and dispossession of their lands.5  
At present, they are still frequently subject to interferences with a variety of their rights 
when asserting their rights to their ancestral territories.6 This is often the result of a conflict 
between their ancestral lands claims and private property rights.7 Oftentimes, it is also in 
connection with development projects which may have an adverse effect on their territories.8 
They are faced with forced evictions,9 criminalisation,10 death threats11, and attacks.12 Also, 
 
1 DAES, Erica-Irene. Indigenous people and their relationship to land. ECOSOC, Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 1999, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/18, paras 10-18. 
2 This text refers to both indigenous and tribal peoples as ‘indigenous’ following the newest standards of 
international law, namely the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the American 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The paper only employs the word ‘tribal’ when necessary for 
the purpose of clarity.  For more information on the definition of indigenous peoples see Chapter 1. 
3 DANNENMAIER, Eric. Beyond Indigenous Property Rights: Exploring the Emergence of a Distinctive 
Connection Doctrine. Washington University Law Review. 2008, 86(1), 86-7, 103-4. 
4 DAES, Erica-Irene. Indigenous people and their relationship to land. ECOSOC, Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 1999, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/18, paras 10-18. 
5 KREIMER, Osvaldo. REPORT OF THE RAPPORTEUR: Traditional Forms of Ownership and Cultural 
Survival, Right to Land and Territories. Working Group to Prepare the Draft American Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2003, OEA/Ser.K/XVI, GT/DADIN/doc.113/03 rev. 1, p. 2. 
6 IACmHR. Medida Cautelar No. 458-19: Miembros de la comunidad Guyraroká del Pueblo Indígena Guarani 
Kaiowá respecto de Brazil. 29 December 2019, para 5. 
7 ibid. 
8 IACmHR. Medida cautelar No. 487-19: Quelvin Otoniel Jiménez Villalta respecto de Guatemala. 3 July 2019, 
paras 7, 14, 16. 
9 IACmHR. Medida cautelar No. 872-17: Familias desalojadas y desplazadas de la Comunidad Maya Q’eqchi 
"Nueva Semuy Chacchilla" respecto de Guatemala. 10 February 2018, Para 17. 
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frequently, their natural resources are adversely affected, and their traditional way of life 
made impossible.13 
One of the root causes for the occurrence of these conflicts over lands is insufficient (or 
no) legislation which would anchor indigenous peoples’ rights to their ancestral lands.14 
Indigenous peoples’ collective land tenure differs from the concept of private property.15 
Therefore, recognising indigenous peoples’ communal land title poses a challenge to the 
established concepts of human rights.16 
In the second half of the 20th century, indigenous peoples started reclaiming their rights, 
and in the 1980s, indigenous peoples’ movements gained strength.17 This phenomenon was 
also reflected in international law regarding indigenous peoples’ land rights – their rights 
started gradually gaining recognition.  
Indigenous peoples began increasingly participating in the negotiations of international 
instruments addressing their rights, namely International Labour Organisation Convention 
No. 169, the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention18 (hereinafter ILO Convention 169) 
and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples19 (hereinafter 
UNDRIP or UN Declaration).20 
 
10 ibid. 
11 IACmHR. Medida Cautelar No. 458-19: Miembros de la comunidad Guyraroká del Pueblo Indígena Guarani 
Kaiowá respecto de Brazil. 29 December 2019, paras 6, 8, 9, 28. 
12 ibid.  
13 IACtHR.  Case of the Indigenous Communities of the Lhaka Honhat Association (Our Land) v. Argentina. 
Judgment of February 6, 2020 (Lhaka Honhat Association), para 289. 
14 DAES, Erica-Irene. Indigenous people and their relationship to land. ECOSOC, Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 1999, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/18, paras 34-37;  
15 GILBERT, Jérémie. Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors. 
Netherlands: Brill | Nijhoff, 2007, p. 88. 
16 ibid. 
17 STAVENHAGEN, Rodolfo. Las organizaciones indígenas: actores emergentes en América Latina. Revista de 
la CEPAL. Santiago de Chile: Naciones Unidas, 1997, 62, p. 63. 
18 C169 - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention. International Labour Organisation, 27 June 1989, 1650 
U.N.T.S. p. 383 (hereinafter ILO Convention 169). 
19 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 13 September 2007, UNGA Res. 61/295, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295, (hereinafter UNDRIP). 
20 ANAYA, S. James a Robert A. WILLIAMS JR. The Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights over Lands and 
Natural Resources under the Inter-American Human Rights System. Harvard Human Rights Journal. 
2001, 14(33), p. 34. 
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ILO Convention 169 is the most recent binding instrument of international law 
specifically addressing indigenous peoples’ land rights. Despite its low number of 
ratifications, this Convention has been widely accepted in the region of Latin America.  21 Out 
of its 23 ratifications, 14 are of Latin-American States.22   
Latin America has, in fact, become the pioneer in laying the groundwork for the 
international legal framework of indigenous peoples’ land rights. One of the examples which 
reflect this trend is the adoption of the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples23 (hereinafter ADRIP or American Declaration) at the Organization of American 
States (hereinafter OAS) in 2016.  
Above all, indigenous peoples’ land rights have been widely addressed within the case-
law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter IACtHR or Court). The main 
basis for this protection has been Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights24 
(hereinafter ACHR or American Convention), which anchors the right to property.  
The present work seeks to analyse this development of international law providing 
protection to indigenous peoples’ land rights in Latin America from the 1980s until the 
present. It compares its cornerstone instruments and examines the case-law of the IACtHR 
addressing this issue. 
Methodology 
Research questions 
1. What are the instruments of international law anchoring indigenous peoples’ land 
rights in the region of Latin America?  
 
21 The term ‘Latin America’ comprises a group of countries where languages which are derived from Latin (i.e. 
French, Portuguese and Spanish) are spoken. Real Academia Española.: Diccionario panhispánico de 
dudas [online]. Madrid: Real Academia Española, 2005. (accessed on 13 May 2020) Available at: 
https://www.rae.es/dpd/Latinoam%C3%A9rica. 
22 Ratifications of C169 - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169) [online]. International 
Labour Organisation. (accessed on 10 March 2020) Available at: 
www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314:N
O. 
23 American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 15 June 2016, (XLVI-O/16) AG/RES.2888 
(hereinafter ADRIP). 
24 American Convention on Human Rights "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica". 22 November 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. p. 
123 (hereinafter ACHR). 
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2. Between the first and most recent, how have the instruments specifically addressing 
indigenous peoples’ land rights developed?  
3. What specific rights of indigenous peoples and relevant obligations of States 
concerning indigenous peoples’ traditional lands stem from the jurisprudence of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights under Article 21 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights? 
 
It is necessary to note the limitations of the present work. The topic of the present paper 
is delimited regionally and by the subject matter. The focus of the present work is on the 
rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral territories in the region of Latin America. 
Indigenous peoples’ rights to their ancestral lands are protected on the basis of various 
human rights. These range from the right to property over the right to self-determination, 
minority rights and environmental rights to the right to life. Thus, the present paper had two 
options for approaching the topic. One option was to devote equal attention to all of these 
rights while analysing all of them rather superficially. Another option was to give a certain 
right more focus than others while being able to dive into its depths.  
The Inter-American System of Human Rights (hereinafter IASHR) stands out in the 
protection of indigenous peoples’ land rights due to the complex body of jurisprudence of the 
IACtHR on indigenous peoples’ land rights under the right to property. As the focus of this 
paper is on Latin America,25 it dedicates an entire chapter to property rights, while all the 
other rights are only addressed briefly in the chapter analysing the international legal 
framework.  
The complex question of the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples is thus 
only discussed succinctly. Similarly, the issue of the status of indigenous peoples under 
international law. Both of these topics bear great relevance for indigenous peoples’ land 
rights; however, they could not be explored in more depth due to the limitations with respect 
to the extent of a master’s thesis.  
 
25 All Latin-American States are members of the OAS and thus also fall under the scope of the IASHR. There 
are two main instruments which form the basis of the IASHR – the American Declaration on the Rights and 
Duties of Man and the American Convention on Human Rights. The IACtHR concluded in its Advisory Opinion 
OC-10/89 that ‘For the member states of the Organization, the [American] Declaration [on the Rights and Duties 
of Man] is the text that defines the human rights referred to in the [OAS] Charter.’ IACtHR. Advisory Opinion 
OC-10/89. Advisory Opinion of July 14, 1989 (para 45). 
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It also should be mentioned that due to the regional delimitation of the topic of this 
paper, not all decisions of the bodies of the IASHR concerning indigenous peoples’ land 
rights fall within its scope.26 
The regional delimitation of the topic is also reflected in the instruments of international 
law which the present work analyses. The paper devotes most attention to those instruments 
which are most reflected in the case-law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights related 
to the region. Some of these instruments are of global international law; some of them were 
produced within the Inter-American System of Human Rights.  
Sources and methods used in the paper 
In order to answer the research questions posed, the present work builds upon various 
types of primary and secondary sources. As to primary sources, the paper analyses the case-
law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. It also draws upon documents produced by 
the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, and the UN human rights bodies.  
Moreover, it examines the records of proceedings, minutes of meetings, and reports of 
bodies of international organisations which capture negotiations of some of the international 
instruments analysed. These sources provided a great amount of information on the context of 
the adoption of the international treaties and declarations enshrining the land rights of 
indigenous peoples.  
The present work also builds upon secondary sources, such as academic articles and 
books which comment on the case-law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as well 
as on the negotiations leading to the adoption of the instruments of international law 
examined in this paper. It also relies on a commentary to the American Convention on Human 
Rights. 
Two main methods are used in the present work. Firstly, the work carries out a 
comparative analysis of the instruments of international law specifically addressing 
indigenous peoples’ land rights and of documents capturing the process of their adoption. The 
paper provides a description and analysis of the current legal framework of indigenous 
peoples’ land rights and the path towards it. It analyses the development of these issues 
 
26 Decisions against States which do not belong to Latin America, such as indigenous-rich Canada and Australia, 
are not analysed in the paper. An exception is the judgement of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the 
case of Saramaka People v. Suriname. This judgement is essential for the subsequent development of the Court’s 
case-law. Therefore, the it is included in the present work.  
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between the adoption of the International Labour Organisation’s Convention No. 107, the 
Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention27 (hereinafter ILO Convention 107) and the 
ADRIP. Thus, its aim is to present the context of the development of indigenous peoples’ land 
rights in international law in the last four decades.  
Secondly, the paper analyses the case-law of the IACtHR. The work examines 
individual cases concerning indigenous peoples’ land rights before the Court. Subsequently, it 
aims to produce an in-depth overview of the current framework of rights and obligations 
under Article 21 ACHR, which follow from the decisions of the IACtHR in this area. It also 
points out a few of its problematic aspects. 
Structure of the paper  
The present work offers an insight into the fundamental findings of the IACtHR while 
providing an overview of the instruments of international law, which served as a basis for its 
decisions.  
It is structured into three main parts. Chapter 1 addresses the issue of the definition of 
the term ‘indigenous peoples’. It points out some issues with an overall consensus on a 
universal definition and considers some of the advantages and disadvantages of such a 
definition. 
Chapter 2 presents a number of key international conventions and declarations which 
deal with indigenous peoples’ land rights. This chapter is divided into two main parts.  
The first part analyses instruments of global international law. At first, it focuses on 
those instruments which contain specific provisions on indigenous peoples’ rights. ILO 
Convention 169 and the UNDRIP are analysed in more depth, both with respect to the process 
of their adoption and their content. 
Instruments of global international law which do not specifically address indigenous 
peoples’ rights are then presented. The paper also describes the monitoring mechanisms and 
the normative activity of some of the monitoring bodies of these instruments since these are 
also discussed in the case-law of the IACtHR.  
 
27 C107 - Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention. International Labour Organisation, 26 June 1957, 328 
U.N.T.S. p. 247 (hereinafter ILO Convention 107). 
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The second part of Chapter 2 deals with instruments of the IASHR. It commences with 
the ADRIP, the only instrument of the IASHR which addresses indigenous peoples’ rights 
specifically. It compares it to the other specific instruments, in particular the UNDRIP, its 
global counterpart. 
Chapter 2 continues with an exposition of relevant provisions of the two main 
instruments of the IASHR – the ACHR and the American Declaration on the Rights and 
Duties of Man28 (hereinafter ADRDM). It seeks to explain why these instruments are 
important in this area even though they do not specifically address indigenous peoples’ land 
rights. 
In the context of some of the instruments discussed in this chapter, the paper analyses 
other rights which provide protection to indigenous peoples’ land rights. Also, it examines 
relevant case-law of the IACtHR under these rights. 
Chapter 3 analyses the core points addressed by the IACtHR in cases regarding 
indigenous peoples’ land rights under Article 21 ACHR enshrining the right to property. It 
attempts to produce a comprehensive overview of the rights and obligations which are 
elaborated in the Court’s jurisprudence, observing some of its problems in the process. 
The Conclusion summarises the findings to which the present research led and attempts 




28 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 2 May 1948, OAS Res. XXX. 
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1. Definition of the term ‘indigenous peoples’ 
Chapter 1 deals with the definition of the term ‘indigenous peoples’. It is divided into 
four subchapters. The first subchapter presents an overview of the most significant attempts to 
produce a definition of this term on the global level.  
Subsequently, the second subchapter gives a few examples of how the issue of 
definition is approached in the IASHR. The third subchapter addresses some of the main 
obstacles of finding consent on a universal definition of the term. 
Finally, the fourth subchapter offers conclusions on the advantages and disadvantages 
of the absence of a universal definition. 
1.1 Definitions at the international level 
There is no universal definition of the term ‘indigenous peoples’ under international 
law, although various attempts have been made throughout the history of the subject. Many of 
them are rooted in the ‘working definition’ used by José R. Martínez Cobo.29 This definition 
was produced in the Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations 
(hereinafter Cobo’s study), published in 1983.  
In his study, Cobo stresses the necessity of recognising the right of indigenous peoples 
to define themselves according to their own criteria. He rejects the definition of indigenous 
peoples through the lens of other, non-indigenous, societies. Cobo further maintains that it is 
for indigenous peoples to define themselves as a group in terms of the differences that they 
see between themselves and other groups.30 
Cobo’s working definition divides the criteria for identification of indigenous peoples 
into two categories: objective and subjective. Objective criteria concern indigenous peoples’ 
historical link with the pre-colonial population. Also, their cultural, social, and legal 
distinctiveness from the current majority population. And lastly, their will to maintain this 
status-quo for their descendants.31  
 
29 The then Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities. 
30 MARTÍNEZ COBO, José R. Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations. 
ECOSOC, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 30 September 1983, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8, paras 368-375. 
31 ibid, para 379.  
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With regard to the historical link, Cobo presents a non-exhaustive list of possible 
distinctive attributes, the continuous presence of which may be sufficient to conclude 
objective indigenousness. These are the occupation of ancestral lands, shared roots with the 
original populations on these lands, culture, language, and occupation of certain regions.32  
As to the subjective criteria, Cobo argues that it is for each individual to self-identify as 
a member of an indigenous people and for members of the group to accept them.33  
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (hereinafter CERD) views 
self-identification as a member of a certain group as the primary criterion. It addresses the 
topic of individuals’ identification as a member of a specific racial or ethnic group in its 
General Recommendation No. 8. The CERD expresses the view that ‘such identification 
shall, if no justification exists to the contrary, be based upon self-identification by the 
individual concerned’.34 Thornberry points out that this results in leaving the onus probandī 
with the one who challenges such a self-identification.35 
Cobo’s subjective and objective criteria are reflected in Article 1 of the 1989 
International Labour Organisation’s (hereinafter ILO) Convention 169.36  
This provision, establishing the Convention’s scope of application, distinguishes 
between tribal peoples and indigenous peoples. The key elements which define indigenous 
peoples according to this provision are: 
1) their descent from inhabitants of the territory at the time of colonisation, 
2) their having their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions, 
3) self-identification as indigenous.  
Tribal peoples:  
 
32 ibid, para 380. 
33 ibid, para 381. 
34 CERD. General Recommendation VIII Concerning the Interpretation and Application of Article 1, 
Paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Convention, Identification with a Particular Racial or Ethnic Group. 22 August 1990, 
A/45/18. 
35 THORNBERRY, Patrick. Indigenous peoples and human rights. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2002, p. 207. 
36 HENRIKSEN, John B. Research on Best Practices for the Implementation of the Principles of ILO 
Convention No. 169: Case Study 7, Key Principles in Implementing ILO Convention No. 169. International 
Labour Organisation, Programme to Promote ILO Convention No. 169, 2008, p. 7. 
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1) have social, cultural and economic conditions which are distinct from the rest 
of the society in the country, 
2) have particular customs, traditions, special laws or regulations, 
3) self-identify as tribal. 37  
ILO Convention 169 thus defines indigenous peoples based on their historical link with 
the relevant territory and, cumulatively, their institutional autonomy. By contrast, it defines 
tribal peoples by their cultural dissimilarity. However, despite defining indigenous and tribal 
peoples separately, the Convention attributes both groups the same rights.38 
The criteria of ILO Convention 169 were preceded by ILO Convention 107 adopted in 
1957. This Convention, however, takes an assimilationist and paternalistic approach towards 
indigenous peoples.39 This approach is also visible in the provision identifying its scope of 
application.  
It regards indigenous peoples’ social and economic conditions as being ‘at a less 
advanced stage than the stage reached by the other sections of the national community’.40 
Also, it labels their life as ‘more in conformity with the social, economic and cultural 
institutions of that time [the time of conquest or colonisation] than with the institutions of the 
nation to which they belong’.41  
It further employs the term ‘semi-tribal’ to identify ‘groups and persons who, although 
they are in the process of losing their tribal characteristics, are not yet integrated into the 
 
37 ILO Convention 169, Article 1. 
38 ILO Convention 169; HENRIKSEN, John B. Research on Best Practices for the Implementation of the 
Principles of ILO Convention No. 169: Case Study 7, Key Principles in Implementing ILO Convention No. 169. 
International Labour Organisation, Programme to Promote ILO Convention No. 169, 2008, p. 7. 
39 ILO Convention 169, Preamble (para 5). 
‘Considering that the developments which have taken place in international law since 1957 (…) have made it 
appropriate to adopt new international standards on the subject with a view to removing the assimilationist 
orientation of the earlier standards.’ 
40 ILO Convention 107, Article 1 (a). 
41 idem.  
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national community’.42 It views the integration of indigenous peoples as the next stage of the 
development of their culture and as one of the main objectives of this Convention.43 
Furthermore, ILO Convention 107 refers not to ‘indigenous peoples’, but to ‘indigenous 
populations’. This proved to be one of the main points of controversy during the negotiations 
of its revision and reworking into ILO Convention 169.44  
Some of the negotiating parties feared that inclusion of the term ‘peoples’ into ILO 
Convention 169 would open a path for indigenous groups to seek the right to self-
determination, a right ascribed to ‘all peoples’ within the framework of international law.45 
They suspected that it could affect the territorial integrity of some States.46 This issue is 
discussed in more depth in section 2.1.2.2 under indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination.   
An attempt to provide criteria for identifying indigenous peoples is contained in the 
World Bank Operational Manual OP 4.10. from 2005. It sets requirements for projects 
proposed by borrower states to the World Bank (hereinafter WB). Even though it is primarily 
intended for the WB staff,47 it is relevant for the rights of indigenous peoples who may be 
affected by projects financed by the WB.48  
In its section on identification of indigenous peoples, the directive states that for various 
reasons, it does not intend to define them. However, it does provide a list of characteristics for 
working purposes, all of which a group has to at least partly possess to be able to identify as 
indigenous. The listed characteristics are: social, cultural, institutional and linguistic 
 
42 ILO Convention 107, Article 1 (b). 
43 ibid, Preamble; ŽÁKOVSKÁ, Karolina. Práva domorodých národů jako nástroj ochrany životního prostředí 
[Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a tool for environmental protection]. ŠTURMA, Pavel a Karolina 
ŽÁKOVSKÁ, ed. Od zákazu diskriminace k ochraně kolektivních práv. 1. Prague: Univerzita Karlova, 
Právnická fakulta v nakl. Eva Rozkotová, 2014, p. 74. 
44 BARSH, Russel Lawrence. Revision of ILO Convention No. 107. The American Journal of International Law. 
81. 1987, 81(3), p. 760. 
45 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S., p. 171 (hereinafter 
ICCPR), Article 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 16 December 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S., p. 3 (hereinafter ICESCR), Article 1. 
46 BARSH, Russel Lawrence. Revision of ILO Convention No. 107. The American Journal of International Law. 
81. 1987, 81(3), p. 760. 
47 World Bank. Operational Manual OP 4.10 – Indigenous Peoples, July 2005, revised April 2013, disclaimer 
under the title. 
48 World Bank. Operational Manual OP 4.10 – Indigenous Peoples, July 2005, revised April 2013, para 1. 
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distinctiveness, vulnerability, collective attachment to a (current or former) ancestral territory, 
and, most importantly, individual and group self-identification as indigenous.49  
In contrast to the WB’s previous manual from 1991, it does not include a requirement of 
subsistence-oriented production. Also, it does not consider national legislation of borrower 
states as a basis for identifying indigenous peoples.50 Moreover, unlike the previous manual, it 
– although under fairly narrow conditions51 – applies to indigenous peoples who have been 
deprived of their ancestral territories.52 
In 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted UNDRIP.53 During the drafting 
process, some African and Asian States insisted on the inclusion of a definition in the 
document. Some of these States, however, were motivated not by the protection of indigenous 
peoples’ rights, but rather by the exclusion of their own indigenous peoples from the scope of 
the Declaration.54  
There was a lack of consensus on the issue throughout the negotiations of the UNDRIP. 
Also, finding a definition which would include all indigenous peoples and only them turned 
out to be an exceptionally complex task. Eventually, an external, objective definition was not 
included.55 After all, it is not the first time a similar declaration does not define its object.56  
It, moreover, does not differentiate between indigenous and tribal peoples and addresses 
both these groups as indigenous. Article 33 of the Declaration, however, recognises 
 
49 World Bank. The World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Directive OD 4.20, September 1991, paras 3-
4. 
50 World Bank. The World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Directive OD 4.20, September 1991, paras 3-
5.  
51 MACKAY, Fergus. The Draft World Bank Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples: Progress or More 
of the Same. Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law. 2005, 22(1), p. 72-73. 
52 World Bank. Operational Manual OP 4.10 – Indigenous Peoples, July 2005, revised April 2013, para 4. 
53 UNDRIP, Article 33. 
54 HENRIKSEN, John B. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Some Key Issues and 
Events in the Process. CHARTERS, Claire and Rodolfo STAVENHAGEN, ed. Making the Declaration Work: 
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People. Copenhagen: IWGIA, 2009, p. 79. 
55 CHÁVEZ, Luis Enrique. The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Breaking the impasse. 
CHARTERS, Claire and STAVENHAGEN, Rodolfo, ed. Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Copenhagen: IWGIA, 2009, p. 103. 
56 CHÁVEZ, Luis Enrique. The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Breaking the impasse. 
CHARTERS, Claire and STAVENHAGEN, Rodolfo, ed. Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Copenhagen: IWGIA, 2009, p. 103; Declaration on the Rights 
of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 3 February 1993, G.A. Res 
47/135, A/RES/47/135. 
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indigenous peoples’ right to self-identification in accordance with their own customs and 
traditions.  
After a long-lasting struggle by indigenous peoples for their right to identify as 
indigenous based on their own subjective criteria,57 here, finally, was an instrument of 
international importance which acknowledged this right.  
1.2 Definition within the Inter-American System of Human Rights   
Just as the UNDRIP, the ADRIP does not contain a definition of indigenous and tribal 
peoples. However, in its scope of application enshrined in Article 1, it stipulates that self-
identification is a crucial factor in identifying indigenous peoples.  
It further emphasises the importance of states’ respect for indigenous peoples’ use of 
their own customs and institutions as the basis for self-identification as indigenous.58 
Similarly to the UNDRIP, it does not differentiate between indigenous and tribal peoples and 
ascribes both groups the same rights. 
In the case of Saramaka v. Suriname,59 the IACtHR was faced with the question of 
whether a certain group can be defined as tribal and thus be entitled to rights ascribed to 
indigenous and tribal peoples under international law.60  
Suriname claimed that the Saramaka people are not entitled to be considered a tribal 
community. It argued that some of the self-identified members of the Saramaka community 
do not live within the traditional territory and do not follow the community’s customs. The 
State argued that this lack of the traditional way of life of some of Saramaka members 
deprives the whole group of its cultural distinctiveness.61  
 
57 BARSH, Russel Lawrence. Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of International Law. The American 
Journal of International Law. 1986, 80(2), p. 375. 
58 UNDRIP, Article 1 para 2.  
59 Even though Suriname is not a Latin-American State, the case of Saramaka v. Suriname appears in various 
sections of this text. The author decided to include it due to the fundamental role which it occupies in the 
IACtHR’s case-law on indigenous peoples’ land rights. 
60 The IACtHR also affirmed in the case of Saramaka v. Suriname, that its jurisprudence concerning indigenous 
peoples’ property rights equally applies to tribal peoples. IACtHR. Case of Saramaka People v. Suriname. 
Judgement of November 28, 2007 (hereinafter Saramaka), para 86. 
61 Saramaka, paras 162, 164. 
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At first, the Court concluded that the Saramaka people make up a tribal community, 
referring to their social, cultural and economic distinctiveness, and their special relationship 
with their ancestral territories.62  
Further, it had to determine whether to consider as tribal certain individuals who self-
identified as members of this group. Responding to the State’s objection, the Court ruled that 
it lay solely with the peoples and their customs, and not with the state or the IACtHR, to 
determine who is a member of a tribal group.63 Moreover, it concluded that the State could 
not use the fact that some individual members of the group do not follow the Saramaka 
traditions and customs as a pretext to deny the rights to the whole group.64  
Similarly, in the case of Xákmok Kásek, it ruled that it was not for the Court or the State 
to determine a community’s ethnic identity or membership, as the self-identification of a 
community forms a part of its autonomy and both the Court and the State are obliged to 
respect it.65 
1.3 Issues with an international agreement on a universal definition  
As can be seen from the foregoing sections, some of the objective criteria used to 
identify indigenous peoples feature throughout the various attempts to define indigenous 
peoples. Particularly present are the following: the relationship of indigenous peoples with 
their ancestral lands, which forms a significant part of their cultural identity;66 their cultural 
distinctiveness inherited from their pre-colonial ancestors and their will to preserve it; and a 
certain degree of institutional autonomy. At the same time, a trend can be observed in the 
increasingly frequent employment of the subjective criteria – the right to both group and 
individual self-identification as indigenous. 
 
62 Saramaka, paras 78-84.  
63 Saramaka, para 164. 
‘Moreover, the question of whether certain self-identified members of the Saramaka people may assert certain 
communal rights on behalf of the juridical personality of such people is a question that must be resolved by the 
Saramaka people in accordance with their own traditional customs and norms, not by the State or this Court in 
this particular case.’ 
64 idem. 
65 IACtHR. Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Judgement of August 24, 2010 
(hereinafter Xákmok Kásek), para 37. 
66 GÖCKE, Katja. Protection and Realization of Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights at the National and 
International Level. Goettingen Journal of International Law. 2013, 5(1), 87-154; GILBERT, 
Jérémie. Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors. Netherlands: Brill | 
Nijhoff, 2007, xvii. 
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However, as previously mentioned, there is no universally accepted legal definition of 
indigenous peoples, and there are various reasons why states have not found consensus on this 
issue.  
The first reason is anthropological and concerns the global diversity of indigenous 
peoples. The Sámi people in Northern Europe, or the Maasai people in Kenya and Tanzania, 
and the Maya Q’eqchi’ people in Central America and Mexico are all indigenous peoples.67 
Yet it is extremely difficult to specify criteria which are sufficiently comprehensive to capture 
this diversity, but which, at the same time, are not overly inclusive.68  
Secondly, consensus over a definition of indigenous peoples has been made difficult by 
opposition from indigenous peoples themselves arising from the position of certain states.69 
Russia70 and India,71 for example, are highly restrictive as to which groups do qualify as 
indigenous under the national criteria and also which rights these peoples are entitled to.72 
China denies the existence of indigenous peoples on its territory whatsoever and attributes 
them rights of ethnic minorities.73 For countries which deny the indigenous status of peoples 
living on their territory, a firm and overly narrow definition could serve as a tool to exclude 
indigenous peoples on their territory from the protection provided by international law.74 It is, 
therefore, difficult to come to an overall consensus on the international level.  
1.4 Conclusions on a definition 
On the one hand, it is crucial to define the holder of a specific right enshrined in 
various international instruments. On the other hand, a firm definition may exclude certain 
 
67 ANAYA, James S. ‘International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move toward the Multicultural 
State.’ Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law. 2004, 21(1), p. 13. 
68 KINGSBURY, Benedict. ‘Indigenous Peoples’ in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian 
Controversy. The American Journal of International Law. 1998, 92(3), pp. 414-415. 
69 ERNI, Christian. Tribes, States and Colonialism in Asia: The Evolution of the Concept of Indigenous Peoples 
and its Application in Asia. IGWIA, 2014, 5. 
70 BERGER, David Nathaniel, ed. The Indigenous World 2019. Copenhagen: The International Work Group for 
Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), 2019, p. 44. 
71 ibid, p. 347. 
72 BARSH, Russel Lawrence. Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of International Law. The American 
Journal of International Law. 1986, 80(2), p. 375. 
73 BERGER, David Nathaniel, ed. The Indigenous World 2019. Copenhagen: The International Work Group for 
Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), 2019, p. 259. 
74 ERNI, Christian. Tribes, States and Colonialism in Asia: The Evolution of the Concept of Indigenous Peoples 
and its Application in Asia. IGWIA, 2014, p. 5. 
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groups due to its being too narrow. It could also result in States’ reluctance to adopt these 
international instruments, which could otherwise contribute to the improvement of the 
situation of indigenous peoples on their territory. 
Indigenous peoples have been fighting for the right to self-definition for decades.75 
During the negotiations of the ILO 169 Convention, an indigenous representative from 
Canada appealed to the participants: ‘This forum is one which is used for bargaining and 
negotiating to achieve a desired result. But how can you negotiate and bargain over who we 
are and what our rights are? (…) How can you bargain away something which does not 
belong to you?’76  
After all, the need for indigenous peoples to define themselves according to their own 
perception, rather than being subject to an external definition imposed upon them by those 
with a different cultural viewpoint was already pointed out in Cobo’s study.77 This was almost 
forty years ago.  
The ILO 169 Convention’s approach was the first step towards ‘decolonising’ the area 
of indigenous peoples’ rights under international law. It was the firm instrument in this field 
of international law which took a pluralistic and multicultural approach.78 The UNDRIP and 
ADRIP confirm this change of direction.  
 
2. International instruments relevant for indigenous peoples’ land 
rights 
Chapter 2 offers an overview of those instruments of international law which in some 
way apply to indigenous peoples’ land rights. Some of these instruments address the issue in 
 
75 STAVENHAGEN, Rodolfo. Las organizaciones indígenas: actores emergentes en América Latina. Revista de 
la CEPAL. Santiago de Chile: Naciones Unidas, 1997, 62, p. 71. 
76 International Labour Conference. Records of Proceedings, Seventy-Sixth Session, Provisional Record 25. 
International Labour Organisation, Geneva, 1989, speech of Ms. Sayers, p. 31/9. 
77 MARTÍNEZ COBO, José R. Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations. 
ECOSOC, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 30 September 1983, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add., paras 368-369. 
78 YUPSANIS, Athanasios. The International Labour Organization and Its Contribution to the Protection of the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Canadian Yearbook of international Law/Annuaire canadien de droit 
international. 2012, 49, 134. 
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an explicit, direct way. Some of them cover it in their scope generally, without specifically 
mentioning indigenous peoples’ land rights.  
The chapter is divided into two subchapters. The first subchapter deals with instruments 
of global international law. The second one focuses on the region of Latin America and 
addresses instruments of the Inter-American System of Human Rights.79  
The text of this chapter also analyses the adoption and content of those instruments 
which specifically address indigenous peoples’ land rights. The aim is to provide an idea of 
the context of the development of this area of international law. The chapter points out some 
of the problematic issues within the negotiations of these instruments. It also compares each 
new instrument which offers specific protection to indigenous peoples’ land rights to the 
second newest one. The aim of this comparative analysis is to demonstrate how the standards 
in this field of international law changed over time. Also, it seeks to answer, which 
problematic points have been resolved so far and which have not. 
2.1 Global level 
This subchapter presents instruments of international law relevant to indigenous 
peoples’ land rights which apply globally. It is divided into two parts.  
The first part analyses three main instruments of global international law which 
explicitly deal with indigenous peoples’ rights to their lands. For ILO Convention 169 and the 
UNDRIP, it compares the protection of indigenous peoples’ land rights enshrined in these 
instruments to the standards of protection of indigenous peoples’ land rights which existed at 
the time of their adoption. 
The second part deals with instruments of global international law which do not 
specifically address indigenous peoples’ land rights. It explains why these instruments are 
also relevant in this field. 
2.1.1 Instruments dealing specifically with indigenous peoples’ rights 
There are three crucial instruments of global international law which address indigenous 
peoples’ land rights specifically. Those are two Conventions of the International Labour 
 
79 For an overview of the instruments of international law discussed in this chapter and their support within the 
region of Latin America, see Annexe II. 
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Organisation – Conventions 107 and 169, and the UNDRIP, a soft-law instrument of great 
importance. 
2.1.1.1 C107 – Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention 
ILO Convention 107 was adopted in 1957.80 It was the first and for a long time the only, 
legally binding international instrument dealing directly with the rights of indigenous 
peoples.81 Before the adoption of its successor, ILO Convention 169, ILO Convention 107 
had been ratified by 27 countries. Ratification of ILO Convention 169 automatically means 
denunciation of ILO Convention 107. For those countries which are parties to ILO 
Convention 107 and have not ratified ILO Convention 169, the former remains in force. It is, 
however, closed for new ratifications.82 To date, ILO Convention 107 remains in force for 17 
countries.83 
In comparison, to date, ILO Convention 169 has been ratified by twenty-three countries, 
fourteen of which are in the region of Latin America. From Latin-American countries, ILO 
Convention 169 has not been ratified by Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, 
Panama, and Uruguay. All of these countries except Uruguay are party to ILO Convention 
107.84 
2.1.1.1.1 Content of ILO Convention 107 
The document is divided into eight parts and consists of provisions on general policy 
(Articles 1-10), land (Articles 11-14), recruitment and conditions of employment (Article 15), 
vocational training, handicrafts and rural industries (Articles 16-18), social security and health 
 
80 It was adopted along with a soft-law instrument which had the same assimilationist approach, the International 
Labour Organisation, R104 – Indigenous and Tribal Populations Recommendation. 26 June 1957, R104. 
81 HITCHCOCK, Robert K. International Human Rights, the Environment, and Indigenous Peoples. 
In: Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy. 5. 1994, 1, p. 6. 
82 ILO Convention 107, Article 36. 
83 See Annexe II; Ratifications of C107 - Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No. 107) 
[online]. International Labour Organisation. (accessed on 10 March 2020) Available at: 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312252. 
84 See Annexe II; Ratifications of C169 - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169) [online]. 
International Labour Organisation. (accessed on 10 March 2020) Available at: 
www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314:N
O;  
Ratifications of C107 - Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No. 107) [online]. International 
Labour Organisation. (accessed on 10 March 2020) Available at: 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312252. 
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(Articles 19 and 20), education and means of communication (Articles 21-27) and general 
provisions (Articles 28-37) concluding the Convention. 
Part I. of the convention contains general policy provisions, which address the 
protection and integration of indigenous peoples into the national communities of the 
respective member states.85 The Convention stipulates, that the aim is to enable indigenous 
peoples ‘to benefit on an equal footing from the rights and opportunities which national laws 
or regulations grant to the other elements of the population’86 and ‘raising their standard of 
living’.87 Even though it employs specific measures to prevent discrimination and ensure 
respect for indigenous customs,88 it adopts a manifestly assimilationist stance.  
These objectives of protection and integration permeate most parts of the convention,89 
namely the provisions on indigenous land rights,90 education91 and employment.92 While in 
line with international consensus on indigenous peoples’ rights at the time of adoption93, this 
integrationist approach led it to later become subject to extensive criticism from indigenous 
peoples, legal scholars and governments.94 
The Convention dedicates four articles to the issue of indigenous land rights. In its 
Article 11, it obliges member states to recognise ‘the right of ownership, collective or 
individual, of the members of the populations concerned over the lands which these 
populations traditionally occupy’. It does not address the special relationship which 
indigenous peoples have with their lands and does not touch the topic of natural resources 
whatsoever.  
 
85 ILO Convention 107, Preamble, Articles 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
86 ILO Convention 107, Article 2 (a). 
87 ILO Convention 107, Article 2 (b). 
88 ILO Convention 107, Articles 3, 7, 8, 9. 
89 RODRÍGUEZ-PIÑERO ROYO, Luis. La OIT y los pueblos indígenas en el derecho internacional.: Del 
colonialismo al multiculturalismo. Revista Trace. 2004, 46, p. 68.  
90 ILO Convention 107, 1957, Article 14 (b). 
91 ILO Convention 107, Articles 17 and 24.  
92 ILO Convention 107, Article 15. 
93 RODRÍGUEZ-PIÑERO ROYO, Luis. La OIT y los pueblos indígenas en el derecho internacional.: Del 
colonialismo al multiculturalismo. Revista Trace. 2004, 46, p. 68. 
94 International Labour Conference. Records of Proceedings, Seventy-Sixth Session, Provisional Record 31. 
International Labour Organisation, Geneva, 26 June 1989, p. 31/9-10, 31/13, 31/16; GILBERT, 
Jérémie. Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors. Netherlands: Brill | 
Nijhoff, 2007, p. 182. 
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Article 12 addresses the removal of indigenous peoples from their lands. This provision 
of the Convention was a source of broad discontent among indigenous peoples.95 It prohibits 
the removal of indigenous peoples without their free consent.  
However, it does allow for the removal of indigenous peoples from their lands, 
considered it is provided for by law, and fulfils one of the given objectives. Indigenous 
peoples’ can be removed from their lands for the purposes of national security, national 
economic development or the protection of their own health. In such a case, no consultation 
or consent is required.96 It stipulates that the displaced community must be compensated. Still, 
it does not make any mention of obligation to return the respective land whenever the grounds 
cease to exist.97  
It further contains a provision on the transmission of rights and States’ obligation to 
respect relevant indigenous customs in this regard, as long as they do not contradict the 
national legal framework.98 Lastly, it prohibits discrimination of indigenous peoples 
concerning domestic agrarian reforms.99   
Throughout the development of international law over the three decades following its 
adoption and with the formation of indigenous peoples’ movements from the sixties 
onwards,100 the Convention slowly started to lose support. In 1989, it was eventually revised 
and reworked into ILO 169 Convention.101 
 
95 BARSH, Russel Lawrence. Indigenous Peoples. BODANSKY, Daniel, Jutta BRUNNÉE and Ellen HEY, 
ed. The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law. OUP, 2008, p. 845. 
96 International Labour Office, 75th Session. Report IV (1): Partial revision of the Indigenous and Tribal 
Populations Convention 1957 (No. 107). Geneva, 1988, p. 62. 
97 ILO Convention 107, Article 12 (1). 
98 ILO Convention 107, Article 13. 
99 ILO Convention 107, 1957, Article 14. 
100 STAVENHAGEN, Rodolfo. Las organizaciones indígenas: actores emergentes en América Latina. Revista de 
la CEPAL. Santiago de Chile: Naciones Unidas, 1997, 62, p. 63; ANAYA, S. James a Robert A. WILLIAMS 
JR. The Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights over Lands and Natural Resources under the Inter-American 
Human Rights System. Harvard Human Rights Journal. 2001, 14(33), p. 34. 
101 ŽÁKOVSKÁ, Karolina. Práva domorodých národů jako nástroj ochrany životního prostředí [Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples as a tool for environmental protection]. ŠTURMA, Pavel a Karolina ŽÁKOVSKÁ, ed. Od 
zákazu diskriminace k ochraně kolektivních práv. 1. Prague: Univerzita Karlova, Právnická fakulta v nakl. Eva 
Rozkotová, 2014, p. 74. 
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2.1.1.2 C169 – Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 
The International Labour Organisation’s Convention No. 169, Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention, was adopted at the ILO in 1989. Its adoption was preceded by 
negotiations carried out between 1988 and 1989 within the Committee on Convention No. 
107. The Committee was composed – as is typical for the ILO – in a tripartite way, of 
representatives of governments, employers, and workers.102  
This new Convention distances itself from the assimilationist approach and paternalistic 
form of its 1957 predecessor. It aims to embrace respect for indigenous peoples’ cultural 
distinctiveness.103 It can be seen, e.g. in the preponderance of collective rights.104 Among its 
further objectives is the acknowledgement of the right of indigenous peoples to set their own 
priorities for their development,105 and recognition of indigenous peoples’ own institutions as 
subjects of interaction with national societies.106  
The Convention is currently the most relevant binding instrument of international law 
explicitly addressing indigenous peoples’ rights. Even though only 23 countries have ratified 
it (mostly Latin-American ones), it is frequently referred to by international human rights 
bodies,107 including the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,108 even in cases related to 
states which are not member states to the Convention.109 
 
102 International Labour Conference. Records of Proceedings, Seventy-Sixth Session, Provisional Record 25. 
International Labour Organisation, Geneva, 1989, p. 25/1, para 1; Constitution of the International Labour 
Organisation. International Labour Organisation. 1 April 1919, Article 7(1). 
103 ULFSTEIN, Geir. Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Land. Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online. 
2004, 8(1), p. 11. 
104 GÖCKE, Katja. Indigene Landrechte im internationalen Vergleich. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 
2016, p. 554. 
105 BARSH, Russel Lawrence. Revision of ILO Convention No. 107. The American Journal of International 
Law. 81. 1987, 81(3), p. 756. 
106 International Labour Office, 75th Session. Report IV (1): Partial revision of the Indigenous and Tribal 
Populations Convention 1957 (No. 107). Geneva, 1988, p. 27. 
107 IACmHR. Las mujeres indígenas y sus derechos humanos en las Américas. 17 April 2017, OEA/SER.L/V/II., 
para 64; HR Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples on her visit to 
Guatemala, 10 August 2018, A/HRC/39/17/Add.3, paras 57, 70 and 103. 
108 IACtHR. Case of the Xucuru Indigenous Peoples and its members v. Brazil. Judgement of February 5, 2017 
(hereinafter Xucuru), para 116. 
109 Saramaka, para 130. 
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2.1.1.2.1 Negotiations of ILO Convention 169 
The negotiations of this Convention were faced with two main areas of dispute. The 
first one was the controversy over the use of the word ‘peoples’ instead of ‘populations’.110 
The second one was about land rights. 
The inclusion of the term ‘peoples’ in ILO Convention 169 instead of ‘populations’ (as 
is the case in ILO Convention 107), led to significant difficulties throughout the negotiations 
on the adoption of this instrument.111 The term ‘peoples’ included in ILO Convention 169, has 
two meanings with regard to indigenous peoples. A symbolic one of proclaiming indigenous 
peoples ‘peoples’ in the meaning of the word ‘nations’ as does, e.g. the aforementioned 
Cobo’s study.112  
The second meaning of the word – a political one – brings along implications under 
international law, within the meaning of the right to self-determination,113 ascribed to all 
peoples in the aforementioned Covenants. There was strong opposition to the inclusion of the 
word ‘peoples’ in the instrument. It was so due to its political implications in terms of the 
right to self-determination.114 Eventually, the term ‘peoples’ was used instead of 
‘populations’. It was, however, restricted in its meaning under international law: 
‘The use of the term peoples in this Convention shall not be construed as having any 
implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law.’115 
This restriction turned it into a rather symbolical proclamation. 
Employment of the term ‘self-determination’ in ILO Convention 169, which had not 
been used in ILO Convention 107, met with strong resistance for similar reasons as the term 
 
110 BARSH, Russel Lawrence. Revision of ILO Convention No. 107. The American Journal of International 
Law. 81. 1987, 81(3), p. 760. 
111 BARSH, Russel Lawrence. Revision of ILO Convention No. 107. The American Journal of International 
Law. 81. 1987, 81(3), p. 760. 
112 MARTÍNEZ COBO, José R. Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations. 
ECOSOC, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 30 September 1983, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add., para 379.  
113 BELLIER, Irène. The Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the World Indigenous Movement. 
In: Griffith Law Review. 2014, 14(2), p. 229.  
114 BARSH, Russel Lawrence. Revision of ILO Convention No. 107. The American Journal of International 
Law. 81. 1987, 81(3), p. 760; Such as for example secession and the establishment of sovereign independent 
states. See, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 24 October 1970, UNGA Res 2625 
(XXV), A/RES/2625 (XXV), The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. 
115 ILO Convention 169, Article 1 para 3. 
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‘peoples’. Some States viewed the right to self-determination ascribed to the indigenous 
peoples as a grave threat to their territorial integrity.116 Opponents of inclusion of the term 
‘self-determination’ argued, that it would prevent many states from ratifying the new 
Convention.117  
On the other hand, the inclusion of the right to self-determination was one of the 
essential requirements of indigenous peoples. Its advocates thus stressed the need for the use 
of the term out of respect for indigenous peoples.118 After all, different wording was used to 
avoid the employment of the term.119 
The second point of dispute was the part of the Convention related to indigenous 
peoples’ land rights. It was due to the crucial role which lands and territories play for both 
indigenous peoples and states. For indigenous peoples, because of their deep spiritual 
connection with their lands and territories. Also, because of their essential meaning for their 
existence.120 For States, because of the fundamentality of territory for their sovereignty.121  
The part on land rights, in fact, involved more than one problematic issue. It was the use 
of the term ‘lands and territories’. Further, the recognition of indigenous land rights and what 
these would comprise. Also, the question of natural resources. And finally, the issue of 
removal of indigenous peoples from their lands.122 
Regarding the use of the term ‘lands and territories’, its employment was demanded by 
indigenous peoples. They maintained that only the word ‘territories’ corresponded with the 
particular meaning which specific parts of the Earth have for them.123  
 
116 International Labour Office, 75th Session. Report IV (1): Partial revision of the Indigenous and Tribal 
Populations Convention 1957 (No. 107). Geneva, 1988, p. 108. 
117 BARSH, Russel Lawrence. Revision of ILO Convention No. 107. The American Journal of International 
Law. 81. 1987, 81(3), p. 760. 
118 idem. 
119 ibid, p. 759-760. 
120 International Labour Office, 75th Session. Report IV (1): Partial revision of the Indigenous and Tribal 
Populations Convention 1957 (No. 107). Geneva, 1988, p. 44. 
121 ULFSTEIN, Geir. Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Land. Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online. 
2004, 8(1), p. 16. 
122 International Labour Conference. Records of Proceedings, Seventy-Sixth Session, Provisional Record 25. 
International Labour Organisation, Geneva, 1989, para 112. 
123 ibid, para 113. 
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Another reason which the indigenous peoples’ representatives presented was that they 
claimed rights not only to lands but also to the whole environment affiliated with the lands. 
The term ‘lands’, therefore, was not sufficient. They argued that territory, by contrast, covers 
everything pertaining to lands – subsoil, airspace, waters, all the resources part of the land, all 
the occupants, and the fauna and flora.124  
Some States, however, feared implications which the use of the term ‘territories’ could 
have under international law. They viewed it as a potential threat to their sovereignty.125 They 
stressed that the inclusion of the unqualified use of the word ‘territories’ in the Convention 
could discourage various States from its ratification.126  
Finally, a compromise was reached. Article 13 paragraph 1 recognises the spiritual 
relationship which indigenous peoples have with their ‘lands or territories’ while Article 13 
paragraph 2 specifies this term. It explains, that for the purposes of Articles 15 and 16 
(addressing the management of natural resources and removal of indigenous peoples from 
their lands), the term ‘lands’ ‘shall include the concept of territories, which covers the total 
environments of the areas which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use’.127  
At the same time, this interpretative provision does not apply to Article 14, which 
covers the recognition of the rights of ownership and possession of indigenous lands. The 
rights of ownership and possession thus rest upon lands rather than resources.  
In specific, Article 14 obliges States to recognise ‘the rights of ownership and 
possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy’.128 The 
government representatives suggested the inclusion of the term ‘use’ along with the terms of 
‘ownership’ and ‘possession’. This proposal, however, met with strong opposition from 
indigenous peoples. They claimed that it would result in even weaker protection than that 
provided in ILO Convention 107.129 Eventually, the word ‘use’ was omitted.  
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For the identification of the object of these rights, representatives of indigenous peoples 
further suggested wording ‘lands which they traditionally occupied or otherwise used’. Use of 
past tense in this provision, however, proved to be unacceptable for the governments as they 
were concerned about possible retroactive recognition of indigenous claims.130  
The discussion also revolved around the extent of the power of indigenous peoples to 
control their lands and the States’ possibility to explore and exploit natural resources pertinent 
to these lands.  
On the one hand, indigenous representatives pointed out the indispensability of natural 
resources for indigenous customs. They asserted the indivisibility of the land and the 
resources attached to it. Moreover, they stressed the current practice of States which carry out 
or consent to exploitation of the resources on indigenous lands regardless of how it may affect 
indigenous peoples’ lives or even existence.131  
On the other hand, governments’ representatives pointed out the diverse legal regimes 
of States regarding the rights to both surface and subsurface natural resources. Within some of 
the domestic legal frameworks, States retain some or all of these rights. They claimed that this 
could prove incompatible with a convention which would grant ownership rights or provide 
extensive protection to indigenous peoples’ rights to these resources.132 Considering the 
indispensability of natural resources for the survival of indigenous peoples and the central 
importance of natural resources for States, it is not surprising that this issue presented one of 
the biggest challenges of the negotiations.  
The negotiating parties attempted to find a middle ground between these opposed 
positions. They included a general provision obliging States to safeguard indigenous peoples’ 
rights to natural resources. A more specific provision follows, stating what these rights 
comprise, i.e. the participation in the use, management and conservation of these resources.133 
It does not attempt to specify what legal regime there should be for indigenous peoples’ rights 
to natural resources due to the aforementioned differing approaches of states towards natural 
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resources. It does, however, address the case where states retain ownership of (some of) these 
resources and it foresees certain procedural guarantees for indigenous peoples.134  
Another issue was the question of free and informed consent of indigenous peoples for 
their removal from their lands. Some negotiating parties required this consent to be an 
absolute condition for such removal to be permissible. In the end, this was not acceptable for 
some government representatives, and implementation of measures and procedures ensuring 
indigenous peoples’ participation in the decision-making process was seen as a more viable 
option.135 
2.1.1.2.2 The final text of ILO Convention 169 
The structure of the final text is almost analogous to that of ILO Convention 107. It 
consists of ten parts, the first six of which address the same issues as the first six parts of ILO 
Convention 107. The parts of ILO Convention 169 are I. General Policy (Articles 1-12), II. 
Land (Articles 13-19), III. Recruitment and Conditions of Employment (Article 20), IV. 
Vocational Training, Handicrafts and Rural Industries (Articles 21-23), V. Social Security and 
Health (Articles 24 and 25), VI. Education and Means of Communication (Articles 26-31), 
VII. Contacts and Cooperation across Borders (Article 32), VIII. Administration (Article 33), 
IX. General Provisions (Articles 34 and 35) and X. Final Provisions (Articles 36-44). 
In its General Policy provisions, it newly enshrines the obligation of States to consult 
indigenous peoples in case legislative or administrative measures which are to be taken may 
directly affect them. This consultation needs to be performed in good faith and with the aim 
of achieving consent. Moreover, it foresees indigenous peoples’ participation in decision-
making over issues relevant to them.136  
In contrast with ILO Convention 107, it anchors indigenous peoples’ right to set their 
own priorities for development, including for their lands.137 It also cedes indigenous peoples 
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somewhat more autonomy concerning their customs. Under ILO Convention 107, states were 
bound to respect indigenous customs as long as they complied with national laws. ILO 
Convention 169 lifts this threshold to ‘fundamental rights defined by the national legal 
system’ and ‘internationally recognised human rights’.138 Moreover, it stresses various times 
the right of indigenous peoples to keep their own institutions, giving them a mandate for 
autonomy over certain matters, including land use.139  
This Convention deals with indigenous peoples’ land rights in seven of its provisions. 
Unlike ILO Convention 107, it obliges states to respect the particular relationship of 
indigenous peoples with their lands, especially its collective aspect.140 It obliges States to 
recognise indigenous peoples’ right of ownership over their lands. Moreover, it newly speaks 
of possession – a right often much more relevant for indigenous legal regimes than 
ownership.141 Neither had been included in the preceding Convention.  
Furthermore, it newly obliges states to adopt measures in order to identify lands over 
which indigenous peoples enjoy ownership rights, to effectively protect these rights, and to 
enact procedures which will allow for resolution of disputes over land.142  
As opposed to its predecessor, it contains provisions on natural resources, namely the 
right of indigenous peoples to participate in their use, management and conservation.143 States 
must also consult the relevant indigenous people concerning the potential impact of 
exploration or exploitation of these resources. It applies to both activities carried out by the 
State or third persons. Further, it sets out the right of indigenous peoples to benefit from these 
undertakings and to be compensated for any loss.144  
The part of ILO Convention 107 on the removal of indigenous peoples from their lands 
also underwent certain modifications. Just as ILO Convention 107, ILO Convention 169 sets 
out the requirement for free and informed consent in case of the removal of indigenous 
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peoples from their lands. Also, similarly as its predecessor, it subsequently waters down this 
provision by allowing for their removal under the condition that suitable procedures 
established by law are in place and the people receive either substitute land or monetary 
compensation.145  
Just as ILO Convention 107, it states that relocation can only be carried out as an 
exceptional measure. Newly, it also sets out that once the grounds for indigenous peoples’ 
displacement are no longer present, they have the right to return to their ancestral territory.146 
Moreover, it employs the term ‘relocation’ rather than ‘removal’ which had been included in 
ILO Convention 107. The term implies that such a removal is always linked to certain 
substitution.147  
It also obliges states to protect indigenous peoples’ lands from the intrusion of third 
persons.148 Like the previous Convention, it incorporates provisions on the transfer of land 
rights between indigenous peoples according to their own customs.  
This time, however, it leaves out the restriction that such transfers must comply with the 
national law. The last provision related to land – a provision on national agrarian programmes 
– retained the very same wording as was used in ILO Convention 107. 
2.1.1.2.3 Conclusions on ILO Convention 169 
Upon drafting of ILO Convention 169, the ILO was faced with the extremely 
challenging task of striking the right balance between what should be done for the protection 
of a vulnerable group and how much States will be willing to compromise. On the one hand, a 
convention which does not offer decent protection to the group it aims to protect is utterly 
futile.  
On the other hand, what is the use of a convention which most States will be unwilling 
to ratify? As opposed to a soft law instrument, it is, moreover, significantly harder to 
negotiate a binding convention which brings along specific commitments of States.  
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It is true that by far not all requirements of indigenous peoples were satisfied by the 
final text of the instrument.149 The negotiating parties did not produce a bullet-proof tool for 
the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights, which are crucial for their survival, yet so widely 
encroached upon.  
Before the final vote on the Convention, some indigenous representatives even urged 
the delegates to vote against its adoption. They disapproved of the Convention mainly due to 
the restriction on the word ‘peoples’150 and the rejection of absolute conditioning of the 
removal of indigenous peoples from their lands upon their free and informed consent.151  
Also, criticism was expressed about the lack of indigenous peoples’ voice within the 
process of drafting of the Convention. After all, it was their rights what was being 
bargained.152  
It should be mentioned about indigenous peoples’ participation within the process of 
drafting of the Convention, that it was the first time when the ILO asked the governments to 
consult indigenous representative agencies in their countries.153 Also, NGOs representing 
indigenous peoples influenced the amendments of the draft convention throughout the 
discussions of the text (mainly through workers’ members).154  
Overall, the negotiations turned out to be a platform, where NGOs had a more 
substantial possibility for presenting their views than had ever happened before during the 
drafting of an instrument of international law.155 
NGOs may have been heard out more than ever before in a setting of this kind. 
However, indigenous peoples once were subjects of international law and closed treaties with 
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European powers from the position of sovereigns.156 The question thus remains whether it is 
enough to give indigenous peoples the same space for participation as to any other minority. 
 Some of the representatives expressed their strong discontent in their speeches at the 
ILO.157 The complex and interesting issue of the status of indigenous peoples under 
international law does, however, not no fall within the scope of this paper.  
Even though the changes with respect to ILO Convention 107 may seem minor, they do 
constitute remarkable progress in international law’s protection of indigenous peoples’ land 
rights.  
The assimilationist spirit was abandoned, indigenous peoples’ special relationship with 
their lands was acknowledged, and the need for protection of their collective land rights, 
including possession, was stressed. It was embedded in the Convention that indigenous 
peoples’ lands include all environment and resources linked to them. The obligation of 
safeguarding indigenous peoples’ rights to natural resources was newly added. Procedural 
guarantees for situations in which indigenous peoples may be affected were set out. Also, it 
was clarified that the relocation of indigenous peoples from their lands should only take place 
under exceptional circumstances. Moreover, the right to return once the reasons for the 
relocation are no longer present was also newly included.  
To date, the Convention has been ratified by 14 out of 20 Latin American countries. It 
serves as a considerably strong base for the protection of indigenous land rights in the region. 
The IACtHR has repeatedly referred to it in its jurisprudence,158 and the Inter-American 
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Commission of Human Rights (hereinafter IACmHR or Commission) has used it as an 
interpretation tool for the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man.159 Both 
bodies relied on it even in cases related to states which are not its state parties.160  
The Convention also managed to gain support from many States, including those which 
had opposed many of the controversial provisions during the negotiations, such as Brazil or 
Venezuela.161  
Furthermore, both indigenous peoples and States relied on its provisions in their 
argumentation during the negotiations of the UNDRIP.162 Some of its provisions fell short of 
indigenous peoples’ expectations – understandably stemming from the hope that past 
injustices would finally be remedied. It, nevertheless, seems that at least in the region of Latin 
America, its moderate progressiveness has shown to be the right strategy for achieving wide 
acceptance by States.  
The ILO, with the help of indigenous peoples, produced a landmark document which 
opened doors to further negotiations, instruments of international law163 (albeit of soft-law 
nature) and judicial decisions,164 which ascribe indigenous peoples significantly stronger 
rights than the Convention itself.  
Thus, it served as a necessary intermediate step between the integrationist approach of 
ILO 107 Convention and the self-determination focus of the UNDRIP. Moreover, various 
 
159 In the Case of Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District (Belize). Report No. 40/04 of 12 October 
2004, the IACmHR held (in the footnote No. 123): 
‘While the Commission acknowledges that Belize is not a state party to ILO Convention (No 169), it considers 
that the terms of that treaty provide evidence of contemporary international opinion concerning matters relating 
to indigenous peoples, and therefore that certain provisions are properly considered in interpreting and 
applying the articles of the American Declaration in the context of indigenous communities.’ 
160 ibid; Saramaka, paras 130, 137. 
161 International Labour Conference. Records of Proceedings, Seventy-Sixth Session, Provisional Record 31. 
International Labour Organisation, Geneva, 26 June 1988, para 37. 
162 CHARTERS, Claire. The Road to the Adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. New 
Zealand Yearbook of International Law. 2007, 4(7), 122. 
163 UNDRIP; ADRIP. 
164 Saramaka, paras 133-137; Constitutional Court of Colombia. Judgement No T-601 of 2011, footnote 61. 
 32 
scholars have argued that (not solely in the region of Latin America) its provisions on 
indigenous peoples’ land rights have crystallised into customary international law.165  
2.1.1.3 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
The UNDRIP is the most progressive soft-law instrument which enshrines indigenous 
peoples’ rights to their lands. The present section describes the way to its adoption and 
analyses its content in comparison with the ILO Convention 169.  
2.1.1.3.1 Adoption of the UNDRIP 
It took more than twenty years of work and negotiations of States delegates, experts, 
representatives of indigenous peoples, and non-governmental organisations from the 
beginning of the drafting of the UNDRIP in the UN Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations (hereinafter WGIP) to its adoption by the UN General Assembly in September 
2007.166 The WGIP was established in 1982 by the Economic and Social Council (hereinafter 
ECOSOC) under the UN Commission on Human Rights’ Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (hereinafter Sub-Commission), which later turned 
into the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.167  
The WGIP is the first international body solely concerned with the topic of indigenous 
peoples, and it played a significant role in the emergence of the world’s indigenous 
movement.168 In 1985, it was invited by the Sub-Commission to produce a Draft Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (hereinafter Draft Declaration). The Fund for Indigenous 
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Populations was established by the United Nations General Assembly (hereinafter UNGA) in 
the same year to support indigenous representatives’ presence at the negotiations.169 The Sub-
Commission finished the Draft Declaration in summer 1993 and submitted it to the UN 
Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter UNCHR) (replaced by the Human Rights Council 
in 2006) for further discussion, modifications, and adoption. 170  
The Working group on the draft declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples was 
created within the UNCHR in 1995.171 The plan was to submit the Draft Declaration to the 
UNGA for its adoption within the International Decade on the World’s Indigenous Peoples 
(1995-2004)172 which had been proclaimed in December 1993.173 
In contrast to the expert Sub-Commission, the UNCHR was a political, human rights 
body, and the discussions of the promoted document showed to be considerably more 
complicated.174 It was therefore only in the Second International Decade on the World’s 
Indigenous Peoples (2005-2015)175 that the UNCHR’s successor – the Human Rights Council 
(hereinafter HR Council) – adopted the Declaration.  It did so by a majority of 30 against 2 
(Canada and Russia) and 12 abstentions. Australia, New Zealand, and the United States – 
states in which significant numbers of indigenous peoples live and which later advocated 
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against the adoption of the Declaration – were not members of the HR Council at the time of 
the vote. 176  
As the Draft Declaration got to the UNGA in September 2006, even more objections to 
the text appeared. Moreover, some African countries, including those which had previously 
supported the declaration in the HR Council, significantly altered their position.177 The 
reasons for this sudden change of heart were multiple.  
Firstly, it was the political lobbying against the declaration performed by Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the US. Secondly, the governments feared that stronger 
indigenous rights could potentially be divisive for the new democracies, recently established 
as a result of decolonisation in the region.178 Thirdly, the Draft Declaration proposed broader 
criteria for identification of indigenous peoples than those set forth in the Cobo’s study from 
1983.179   
Even though the identification of indigenous peoples in the Draft Declaration was based 
on Cobo’s criteria, it was subsequently broadened by the WGIP, as the historical primacy on 
the respective territory was no longer considered the sole determinant for identification.180 It 
would mean that many African peoples who would have fallen outside of the scope of the 
Cobo’s definition would suddenly qualify as holders of the rights entrenched in the 
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Declaration.181 Due to this change of position, the vote on the Draft Declaration was deferred 
to the following session to provide more time for consultations on the instrument.182  
Eventually, in September 2007, after many compromises made on both sides, the 
Declaration was finally adopted by a majority of 144 with 4 states voting against it (Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) and 11 abstaining. All Latin American states 
voted in favour, except Colombia, which abstained.183 
2.1.1.3.2 The final text of the UNDRIP 
The final text of the declaration rejects assimilation of indigenous peoples – just as ILO 
Convention 169. Also, similarly to ILO Convention 169 – the majority of the rights it 
enshrines are of collective nature.184  
In the Preamble, the UN Declaration acknowledges the severe effects colonisation and 
land dispossession had on indigenous peoples’ lives and recognises that indigenous peoples’ 
rights to their lands, territories and resources are their inherent rights. It further stresses in the 
Preamble the advantages of indigenous peoples’ control over issues affecting them and 
emphasises the benefits their culture has for the environment.  
Moreover, it reaffirms the fundamental role of collective rights for indigenous peoples’ 
survival. It points out that treaties between states and indigenous peoples are of international 
concern and goes on to reiterate the significance of the right to self-determination, listing the 
international instruments in which it is anchored. It further prohibits any denial of the exercise 
of this right in accordance with international law by any provision of the Declaration.185  
In its operative text, the Declaration prohibits any discrimination towards indigenous 
peoples. Also, in contrast to ILO Convention 169, it explicitly enshrines their right to self-
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determination. It further points out its implications for indigenous peoples, namely their right 
to autonomy concerning their internal affairs.  
The provisions on self-determination were, once again, a bone of contention throughout 
the drafting and negotiations of the Declaration.186 Neither this time are they free of 
restrictions.187 During the negotiations of the Declaration, indigenous peoples asserted that the 
inclusion of a restrictive provision was discriminatory towards indigenous peoples. They 
argued that no such clausula is included in the Covenants addressing ‘all peoples’ and that 
they should have the same rights as all the other peoples.188  
The document further recognises indigenous peoples’ both collective and individual 
right to maintain their distinctive culture and way of life without any external interference, 
including dispossession of lands, forced evictions or assimilation.189 It affirms indigenous 
peoples’ right to maintain their own institutions for the management of their own affairs, 
including their right to development and means of subsistence.190 It also stresses indigenous 
peoples’ right to participate in the decision-making of the state ‘if they so choose’.191 
Another matter which caused a lot of controversy among states was the issue of consent 
of indigenous peoples in case of measures which may affect them.192 The debate revolved 
around whether the requirement of States to act in a way to obtain indigenous peoples’ 
consent equals to the right of indigenous peoples to cast a veto.193 The UNDRIP stipulates 
that free and informed consent and an agreement on compensation must precede any 
relocation of indigenous peoples. Just as ILO Convention 169, the Declaration foresees the 
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possibility of return whenever plausible.194 Newly, this Declaration does not provide States 
with any alternative option where indigenous peoples do not grant consent with such 
relocation.  
The Declaration further sets out various procedural obligations of States concerning 
actions which may have some impact on indigenous peoples. It prescribes a general duty to 
‘consult and cooperate in good faith’ ‘in order to obtain [indigenous peoples’] free, prior and 
informed consent’ for measures which may affect them. In such a case, the Declaration 
expects indigenous peoples to select their own representatives with which the State is obliged 
to carry out these consultations.195  
The Preamble further encourages States’ consultation and cooperation with indigenous 
peoples when selecting measures to ensure compliance with international human rights law in 
cases which concern them.196  
Prior consultations and cooperation with the aim of obtaining free and informed consent 
are also specifically foreseen by the Declaration in the event of permitting or undertaking any 
projects which may affect indigenous territories. This obligation is tied, namely to exploration 
and exploitation of natural resources, and the State is further expected to act in a way to lessen 
any potential harm.197  
Unlike ILO Convention 169, the Declaration does not explicitly allow states to establish 
any alternative procedures in case consent is not obtained. It, however, formulates the 
consent-related obligation more as an obligation of conduct rather than one of the result.198 
Still, the wording is one step more favourable to the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights 
than ILO Convention 169. Moreover, the IACtHR has further elaborated on this provision 
when addressing the issue of free, prior and informed consent in its case-law.199 
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States are further not allowed to dispose of or store dangerous materials on indigenous 
peoples’ territories without their prior and informed consent.200 Just as in the case of the 
relocation of indigenous peoples, States do not have any alternative measures in case 
indigenous peoples’ consent is not obtained. This provision bears considerable relevance for 
indigenous peoples as it gives them a tool to influence the use of pesticides and other toxic 
chemicals on their lands.201 
As concerns indigenous peoples’ land rights, the final text of the UNDRIP addresses 
them primarily in the group of provisions of Articles 25-30 and 32. However, given the 
crucial role which lands play for indigenous culture and the unorderly structure of the 
instrument, land rights, in fact, permeate in various forms the entire Declaration. Provisions 
on lands, territories and resources were one of the main subjects of argument in the 
negotiations of the UNDRIP. Just as throughout the negotiations of ILO Convention 169. 
There was a dispute over the reference to the relationship of indigenous peoples with 
their lands as ‘material’ for which indigenous peoples were advocating. In the end, they 
surrendered this requirement most likely in exchange for a broadly formulated provision 
stipulating to which lands indigenous peoples have rights.202  
Article 26 para 1 of the Declaration embeds indigenous peoples’ ‘right to the lands, 
territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or 
acquired’. The past tense wording of the provision gives indigenous peoples a stronger claim 
than that of Article 14 of ILO Convention 169. Article 14 of ILO Convention 169 speaks – in 
the present tense – of rights ‘over the lands which they traditionally occupy’.203  
However, this article only speaks of a right in general; it does not specify the quality of 
the right. The quality is specified in the second paragraph of the same article. The provision 
stipulates that indigenous peoples have the right to ‘own, use, develop and control the lands, 
territories and resources (…)’ which they currently possess. This paragraph is, nevertheless, 
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written in the present tense, narrowing the right of indigenous peoples to own, use, develop 
and control only the lands and natural resources which they possess at the moment.204  
Compared to ILO Convention 169, it, nevertheless, does explicitly mention the right of 
indigenous peoples to own natural resources.205 Moreover, it envisages States’ recognition of 
indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems. It requires states to 
establish a process which will facilitate the recognition and adjudication of indigenous 
peoples’ rights to lands, territories and resources both present and past.206  
In addition, the UNDRIP newly anchors indigenous peoples’ right to restitution, or 
alternatively compensation for lands, territories and resources, which they have in some way 
been deprived of without their free, prior and informed consent.207 Some States also insisted 
on the inclusion of a clause ensuring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the application of the indigenous peoples’ rights enshrined in the Declaration.208 This 
provision was not to the liking of the indigenous representatives. Charters argues that the 
likely objective of the inclusion of this restrictive provision was to protect the rights of the 
current landowners.209  
As to other rights which are in various ways related to land rights, the document also 
addresses indigenous peoples’ rights to manifest their past, present, and future culture through 
religious and archaeological objects and sites.210  
Also, it sets out the obligation of states to return property which had been illicitly 
seized.211 It mentions labour rights protection212 and incorporates provisions on indigenous 
peoples’ rights concerning their traditional medicines. Additionally, it incorporates 
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indigenous peoples’ right to the highest attainable standard of health,213 borrowing the 
formulation of Article 12 ICESCR. 
Moreover, it addresses the protection of women, children, the elderly, and persons with 
disabilities,214 as well as of indigenous languages, education, and media.215 
2.1.1.3.3 Conclusions on the UNDRIP 
The works on the Declaration started three years ahead of those on ILO Convention 
169. Eventually, the Declaration turned out to be a significantly more progressive document 
than the Convention.  
By far not all requirements of indigenous peoples were fulfilled, many of the provisions 
in the original draft were watered down, and the structure of the instrument is somewhat 
chaotic. Yet, it still was a significant leap forward when compared to ILO Convention 169.  
The right to self-determination – although in a circumscribed form – was explicitly 
confirmed. Land rights were recognised as indigenous peoples’ inherent rights. Indigenous 
peoples’ right to lands which they had occupied in the past was affirmed. Their right to 
restitution of ancestral territories lost without their free, prior and informed consent was 
enshrined for the first time. Indigenous peoples’ right to own natural resources was newly 
anchored in a legal instrument of an international character. Finally, states’ obligation to 
consult and cooperate with indigenous peoples in good faith in order to obtain a free, prior 
and informed consent was set out.  
For the relocation of indigenous peoples from their traditional lands and the placement 
of dangerous materials on their territories, the need for a free, prior and informed consent is 
moreover formulated as unconditional.216 
There are various factors which may have played a role in this progressiveness. Firstly, 
as follows from the two foregoing sections, the UNDRIP was eventually adopted eighteen 
years later than ILO Convention 169. This allowed for more developments to take place both 
in international law (such as delivering of a landmark judgement on indigenous peoples’ land 
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rights by the IACtHR217) and states’ constitutional law. One of these developments was the 
adoption of ILO Convention 169, which laid the groundwork for the UNDRIP.  
Secondly, the indigenous movement’s gaining strength218 also played a critical role in 
creating a climate more amenable to indigenous peoples’ claims.  
Thirdly, the fact that the Declaration is a soft-law instrument with no supervisory 
mechanism possibly led to States’ greater willingness to recognise a broader spectrum of 
indigenous peoples’ rights. This way, it still lays fully with them to decide which rights they 
will implement into their national laws as opposed to a binding instrument such as is ILO 
Convention 169.  
Upon the UNDRIP’s adoption, some States’ representatives asserted that the 
Declaration could not be seen as evidence of customary international law. Namely, it was the 
representatives of Australia, Canada and Colombia. Moreover, they fiercely emphasised its 
non-binding nature.219  
The Declaration itself claims to embed the minimum standards for indigenous peoples’ 
existence.220 Even though it is a mere declaration, a soft-law, non-binding instrument, some 
authors argue that its parts do reflect customary international law in the field of indigenous 
peoples’ rights.221  
Besides, it serves as a powerful tool for interpretation of other legal instruments in the 
context of indigenous peoples’ rights,222 which is evidenced by the decisions of international 
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judicial and other human-rights bodies (including the IACtHR) produced over the first 
thirteen years of its existence.223  
Finally, it served as an example for the works on the American Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was adopted in 2016, thus leaving a strong imprint on 
the legal framework of indigenous peoples’ rights in the region of Latin America.  
2.1.2 Relevant global instruments of international law not specifically addressing 
indigenous peoples’ rights  
This second part of the first subchapter describes instruments international law which 
apply globally and bear some relevance for indigenous peoples land rights, despite not 
addressing the topic explicitly. It is the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on the Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR), International 
Covenant on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter ICESCR), and 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(hereinafter ICERD).  
Very important are further the general comments and recommendations produced as a 
means of interpretation of the aforementioned three Conventions. Due to the activity of the 
Human Rights Committee (hereinafter HRC), Committee on the Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (hereinafter CESCR) and the CERD – especially their jurisprudence on 
individual complaints, as well as the general observations on country reports – these 
international law instruments have also become increasingly relevant for the protection of 
indigenous peoples’ land rights.  
Another instrument which can be mentioned in this context is the Declaration on the 
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities 
(hereinafter DRM).  
Moreover, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter CRC) and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (hereinafter CBD) also apply to indigenous peoples’ land 
rights. It is mainly due to the cultural and environmental aspects of indigenous peoples’ 
relationship with their territories. 
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2.1.2.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
This fundamental human rights instrument which serves as a base for global protection 
of human rights, was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948.224 Rights which are 
anchored in the Declaration were later embedded in international conventions, namely the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR.  
It contains many provisions relevant to the protection of indigenous peoples’ land 
rights. Mentioned should be those of Article 1 (equality in dignity and rights), Article 2 
(access to rights without distinction), Article 3 (the right to life), Article 4 (protection of the 
law without any discrimination), Article 12 (right to privacy), Article 17 (the right to 
property), Article 23 (the right to work), Article 25 (the right to adequate health, food, 
housing and medical care), and Article 27 (the right to participate in the cultural life). These 
rights are further analysed in the context of the instruments of international law addressed in 
this chapter and in the case of the right to property in Chapter 3. 
2.1.2.2 International Covenant on the Civil and Political Rights 
One of the instruments of the global human rights system which offer protection to 
indigenous peoples’ land rights is the ICCPR. The ICCPR was adopted in 1966 and entered 
into force upon its ratification by 35 states in 1976. To date, there are 173 state parties to the 
Covenant, including all Latin American countries except Cuba. Cuba signed the Covenant in 
2008 but has not ratified it.225  
The Covenant counts on three monitoring mechanisms, which are within the 
competence of the HRC. The first mechanism consists of States’ submission of reports. These 
reports contain information on compliance with the Covenant and measures which the states 
undertook to ensure this compliance. This mechanism is anchored in Article 40 of the 
ICCPR.226  
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From 1992, the HRC issues concluding observations upon consideration of these 
reports.227 In these observations, it addresses the content of these reports and produces 
recommendations for the State parties to improve their compliance. This mechanism is 
especially relevant for indigenous peoples’ land rights, as it enables the HRC to provide 
observations on States’ compliance with Article 1 of the ICCPR, which enshrines the right to 
self-determination. It contrasts with the HRC’s competence to review individual complaints 
described below from which Article 1 is excluded.228 
The second monitoring mechanism is construed upon the provision of Article 41 of the 
ICCPR. It allows State parties to accept the competence of the HRC to review 
communications submitted by other State parties alleging their non-compliance with the 
ICCPR. The HRC only accepts these communications from state parties which had accepted 
its competence in this regard.229 So far, 50 state parties made a declaration recognising this 
competence of the HRC. From Latin American countries, this declaration has been issued by 
Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Peru.230 
The third monitoring mechanism consists of individual complaints. The UNGA adopted 
the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR which establishes this mechanism in the same year as the 
ICCPR itself.231 Based on this protocol, individuals, who claim that their rights under the 
ICCPR have been violated, can submit communications to the HRC.  
As has been mentioned, Article 1 of the ICCPR is, however, excluded from the 
individual complaints’ mechanism. It is so because it does not enshrine individual rights.232 
Furthermore, individual complaints can only be filed against States which are parties to the 
Optional Protocol. To date, it has been ratified by 116 States. From Latin American States, 
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only Cuba and Haiti are not state parties to the Protocol.233 The HRC has dealt with 
indigenous peoples’ land rights also within the framework of individual complaints.234  
The HRC has moreover produced non-binding documents which serve as a guideline 
for the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Covenant – the General 
Comments (hereinafter GCs). The GCs comments build upon the Committee’s experience 
with a significant number of state party reports.235 GC No. 23 on minority rights is the most 
relevant one for indigenous peoples’ land rights. 
The ICCPR does not explicitly mention indigenous peoples in any of its provisions. 
Nevertheless, indigenous peoples’ land rights do fall under the scope of some of its 
provisions. Article 1, which anchors the right to self-determination and Article 27 on the 
rights of minorities, are most frequently applied in this context. 
Article 6 on the right to life may also play a role. Indigenous peoples’ rights are not 
explicitly addressed in the GC No. 36 on the right to life.236 Issues under Article 6 may, 
however, arise, for example, in connection with environmental harm caused to indigenous 
territories.237  
One of the two articles of the Covenant, which are most relevant for indigenous 
peoples’ land rights is Article 27. It addresses the rights of ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities. Its provisions incorporate the negative right of the members of these groups not to 
be denied the right to enjoy their distinctive culture, religion and language with the other 
members of their group.238 The ICCPR does not contain any definition of minorities. 
Indigenous peoples’ land rights are protected on the basis of minority rights,239 and thus 
also under Article 27.240 This also follows from the HRC’s GC No. 23 mentioned above. In 
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this GC, the Committee emphasizes the indispensable role of territories and resources for the 
indigenous peoples’ way of life and culture.241  
Even though minorities’ rights do cover indigenous peoples’ rights, there are some 
notable differences. Under international law, indigenous peoples’ rights reach further than 
minorities’ rights. This is why States sometimes do not recognise certain groups as indigenous 
peoples, but rather view them as minorities.242 Also, indigenous peoples sometimes oppose 
the view that they belong to minorities, referring to the fact that they had been sovereign 
peoples in the past.243  
Instruments of international law addressing the rights of minorities, in essence, aim to 
guarantee these groups’ participation in the decision-making of the majority. Their objective 
is to ensure that the majority societies protect the interests of the minorities in their decision-
making.244  
By contrast, instruments of international law focusing solely on indigenous peoples’ 
rights are formulated in a way to provide indigenous peoples with a high degree of autonomy 
and control over their own matters, including the development.245 Henriksen argues, that, e.g. 
in the UNDRIP, the right of indigenous peoples to participate in the decision-making of the 
State is constituted as a secondary right to that of maintaining their own autonomous 
institutions.246  
Moreover, unlike for minorities, the protection of land rights plays a major role for 
indigenous peoples.247  
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Another characteristic of indigenous peoples’ rights is that they are predominantly of a 
collective character – they are peoples’ rights. Minority rights are individuals’ rights.248 The 
HRC affirms the individual character of the rights enshrined in Article 27 in its GC on the 
rights of minorities. Nevertheless, it also notes that States may be obliged to adopt certain 
measures in order to ensure the possibility of individuals to enjoy these rights in a 
community.249   
The second right enshrined in the ICCPR, which is crucial for indigenous peoples’ land 
rights is the right to self-determination. This right is grounded in Article 1 common to the 
ICCPR and ICESCR. Besides, it forms one of the core principles enshrined in the UN 
Charter.250 The first paragraph of this article anchors this right as ‘all peoples’’ right to ‘freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development’.251 Paragraph 2 subsequently elaborates on the economic content of this right – 
the free disposition of their natural wealth and resources. It further stipulates that no people 
may be deprived of its means of subsistence.252  
In its GC No. 12 addressing this article, the HRC reiterates, that this right is interrelated 
with other provisions of the Covenant.253 The HRC does not mention indigenous peoples in 
the GC. It is, however, necessary to point out, that the document was produced in 1984. At 
that point, the debate on indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination was at its outset. The 
HRC does ascribe the right to self-determination to indigenous peoples in its more recent 
documents referring to this right.254 
For various reasons, this right stands out among other rights embedded in the 
Covenants. It is entrenched separately in Part I of the Covenants, whereas all the other rights 
are to be found in Part III. This relates to another one of its distinctive features - it is a 
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collective right, while all the other rights enshrined in the Covenant are individual ones.255 
Therefore, as mentioned above, the HRC does not have the competence to review individual 
complaints on its violations.  
There are also quite a few problematic issues to this right.256 The concept of self-
determination originated in the time of decolonisation. It has thus been a subject of long-
standing debate, whether this right only applies in the context of decolonisation, or whether it 
is universal and subject to further development. Thornberry argues that the right is universal 
and continuing. He draws this conclusion from the HRC’s requirement of states to also report 
on the internal processes illustrating compliance with this right.257  
Another problematic issue – not unrelated to the previous one – concerns the subject of 
this right – all peoples. Who are all peoples? Any peoples? Or only colonised peoples?258 
Even though there were attempts to produce a definition of the term ‘peoples’ upon the 
drafting of the Covenants, they were unsuccessful due to the lack of consent.259 This issue is 
related to another question – is the right to self-determination enshrined in the instruments 
addressing indigenous peoples’ rights identical with the one enshrined in Article 1 of the 
Covenants?  
There is one notable difference between the right to self-determination enshrined in the 
Covenants and that anchored in instruments specifically addressing indigenous peoples’ 
rights. Those instruments of international law which provide specific protection to indigenous 
peoples’ rights, and contain the right to self-determination, also contain a provision restricting 
this right. Namely, it is the UNDRIP and ADRIP. These restrictive provisions always prevent 
any interpretation of this right, which could affect the territorial integrity of States, and 
potentially lead to secession.260 
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The right to self-determination has two aspects – an external and an internal one.261 The 
external right to self-determination entails the right of peoples to determine their political 
status, be equal with all other peoples and to not be subjugated by another nation.262 As has 
been mentioned, the external aspect of the right to self-determination has been a source of 
great resistance on the side of many States when negotiating international instruments.263 It 
was this external aspect of the right to self-determination, which constituted the grounds for 
the formation of independent States in the era of decolonisation. 
On the other hand, the internal aspect of self-determination means the right of peoples 
to be in control of decision-making about matters which concern them; it comprises the 
decision-making power over social, economic and cultural issues, including land and natural 
resources.264 It seems that it is this internal aspect of the right to self-determination, which is 
enshrined in the UNDRIP and ADRIP. 
The internal aspect of the right to self-determination has been gaining increasing 
support as the basis for indigenous peoples’ rights to lands, territories and resources, 
especially in the region of Latin America.  
In its judgement in the case of Saramaka People v. Suriname, the IACtHR interpreted 
the provision of Article 21 of the ACHR on the right to property265 in light of the right to self-
determination under Article 1 common to the Covenants. The Court held that the Saramaka 
people had the right to ‘freely determine and enjoy their own social, cultural and economic 
development, which includes the right to enjoy their particular spiritual relationship with the 
territory they have traditionally used and occupied’.266  
 This inclusion of indigenous peoples’ rights to lands and natural resources under the 
scope of the right to self-determination is also present in some of the constitutions of the Latin 
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American States, namely Mexico and Bolivia.267 The interpretation of the right to self-
determination as the basis for the rights of indigenous peoples over their lands and natural 
resources is further reflected in the case-law of national courts in the region.268  
This trend has also been observed by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz. Tauli-Corpuz has pointed out that in addition to 
national case-law, there is a growing jurisprudence from the UN treaty bodies linking the 
right to lands and resources with the right to self-determination.269  
One such example is the HRC’s interpretation of the aforementioned Article 27 ICCPR 
on minority rights in light of Article 1 in its concluding observations on Mexico.270 It urged 
that Mexico guarantee indigenous peoples both their individual and collective rights. These 
rights included indigenous peoples’ usufruct of their lands and resources under ICCPR Article 
1(2), and mainly, their right to self-determination.271  
Similarly, the HRC called on Chile, also referring to Article 1 jointly with Article 27 to 
observe its obligation to demarcate indigenous peoples’ lands.272 It should be noted that the 
HRC interprets the right to self-determination jointly with Article 27 despite the fact that 
minorities are not generally subjects of the right to self-determination. The right to self-
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determination is a peoples’ right; minority rights are individuals’ rights.273 The rights both 
under Article 1 and 27 thus only pertain to peoples who, at the same time, are a minority. 
The link between the right to self-determination and indigenous peoples’ rights to their 
territories and resources has also been observed by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples further in her report on her visit to Guatemala. The UN Special 
Rapporteur mentioned in the report that the right to consultation arises out of indigenous 
peoples’ substantive rights, namely the right to self-determination and the rights over lands, 
territories and natural resources which are associated with it.274 Therefore, there seems to be 
growing evidence that the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination also entails their 
rights to lands and natural resources.275  
Upon closer scrutiny of the right to self-determination, however, certain issues can be 
identified. Namely, that the provision of Article 1 common to the Covenants, anchors the 
public sovereignty over a territory (imperium).276 However, indigenous peoples’ rights to 
lands and natural resources, as they have been discussed above, refer to the right to private 
property (dominium).277 
Nevertheless, the concept of indigenous peoples’ communal rights over lands and 
natural resources does not directly correspond to the right to private property either. It is so 
due to the collective character of this relationship.278  
It thus seems that the concept of indigenous peoples’ communal rights to their lands, 
territories and resources can be placed somewhere in between imperium and dominium. It is 
so due to its public, collective aspects linked with the right of indigenous peoples to 
autonomy, including the management of their own subsistence and development on the one 
hand. And also due to its private aspects, linked with ownership rights, on the other. It, 
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however, does not easily match either of these two categories. It remains for the further 
developments within this area of international law to bring more clarity on which of these two 
categories this concept will better fit into. Or whether a third category will emerge.  
2.1.2.3 International Covenant on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
The ICESCR also has its place in the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights. Like the 
ICCPR, it was adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1976. To date, there are 170 State 
parties to the Covenant. All Latin American countries are also State parties to this Covenant 
with one exception – Cuba, which has signed it but not ratified.279 
From 1985, the monitoring of the Covenant is carried out by the CESCR, which was 
established by an ECOSOC resolution.280 It replaced a working group previously set up 
within the ECOSOC.281  
The ICESCR relies on various monitoring mechanisms. Just like the HRC, the CESCR 
revises State reports and produces concluding observations. The CESCR has produced many 
concluding observations addressing the topic of indigenous peoples’ land rights.282 Apart 
from State reports, it receives reports from specialised UN agencies regarding States’ 
implementation of the rights enshrined in the Covenant.283  
Since quite recently, it can also revise communications from individuals and State-
parties alleging – upon a State declaration accepting this competence – Covenant violations. 
This competence was introduced by the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It was adopted in 2008 and came into force in 2013.  
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This Protocol also gives States the possibility to declare that they recognise the 
CESCR’s competence to undertake an inquiry in the event of an indication of grave human 
rights violations by the State party.284 To date, 24 states have become parties to the Optional 
Protocol, out of which eight are in the region of Latin America. Three more Latin-American 
countries have signed the Protocol but not yet ratified. Five State parties have made a 
declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the CESCR to revise inter-state communications and 
to undertake the inquiry procedure. Of Latin-American countries, only El Salvador has done 
so.285 
 There are various provisions which are relevant to the protection of indigenous 
peoples’ land rights. It is the right to self-determination (Article 1) which both Covenants 
share. Additionally, the CESCR has addressed indigenous peoples’ land rights namely in 
connection with the right to adequate housing, food and water (Article 11 paragraph 1), the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health (Article 12), and the right to take part in 
cultural life (Article 15 paragraph 1[a]). 
Just as the HRC, the CESCR has produced a number of GCs which address indigenous 
peoples’ land rights. The GC No. 12 deals with the right to adequate food anchored in Article 
11 ICESCR. The Committee explains that the right to food also encompasses its economic 
and physical accessibility. It specifically points out that the lack of access of indigenous 
peoples to their ancestral lands leads to their particular vulnerability.286 
The Committee’s GC No. 15 provides guidance on the right to water under Articles 11 
and 12. The CESCR interprets this article in conjunction with Article 1 para 2 of the 
Covenant, which states that a people may not be deprived of its own means of subsistence. In 
view of the foregoing, the CESCR calls upon States to ensure indigenous peoples’ adequate 
access to water for subsistence farming in order to secure their livelihood.  
States should also adopt special measures to prevent the pollution of the resources on 
indigenous peoples’ ancestral territories and also their encroachment. Additionally, the 
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Committee asks States to facilitate indigenous peoples’ own control of their access to 
water.287 
The Committee has also produced a GC on the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health grounded in Article 12. In its GC No. 14, the CESCR draws attention to the role which 
territories play for indigenous peoples’ health. The Committee notes the necessity for 
protection of medicinal plants, animals and minerals which indigenous peoples need to fully 
enjoy their right to health.  
Moreover, it emphasises the collective aspect of indigenous peoples’ health. It 
especially mentions development activities which result in an involuntary removal of 
indigenous peoples from their traditional territories. The CESCR observes that this 
displacement leads to ‘denying them their sources of nutrition and breaking their symbiotic 
relationship with their lands’ and thus ‘has a deleterious effect on their health’.288  
The IACtHR refers to this GC in the case of Yakye Axa v. Paraguay. The Court pointed 
out that the lack of access of the Yakye Axa community to their traditional lands and 
resources deprived them also of the possibility ‘to obtain clean water and to practice 
traditional medicine to prevent and cure illnesses’.289 
The Committee’s GC No. 7 on the right to adequate housing enshrined in Article 11(1) 
points out the particular vulnerability of indigenous peoples (among other groups) with regard 
to forced evictions.290 
The CESCR also addresses indigenous peoples’ land rights in its GC No. 21 dealing 
with the right to take part in cultural life. This right is enshrined in Article 15, paragraph 1(a) 
ICESCR. In the GC, the Committee emphasises the communal nature of indigenous peoples’ 
culture, which also encompasses their traditional lands, territories and resources.  
The Committee points out the essential role which ancestral lands, territories and 
resources play in indigenous peoples’ way of life and cultural identity. Also, the CESCR 
appeals to states to recognize their rights to ‘own, develop, control and use their communal 
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lands, territories and resources’ and to return those lands and territories which have been 
taken away without their free, prior and informed consent.291 
2.1.2.4 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
Another instrument significant for the land rights of indigenous peoples on the global 
level, albeit not specifically mentioning them, is the ICERD adopted in 1965. Currently, there 
are 182 member states to the Convention, including all 22 Latin American states.292 The rights 
enshrined in the ICERD can be both individual and collective.293 A provision which crucial 
for indigenous peoples’ land rights is that of Article 5. This article enshrines the prohibition of 
discrimination with respect to the ‘right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others’.294 Compliance with the ICERD is monitored by the CERD. 
The CERD has three monitoring mechanisms within its competence which are similar 
to those of the HRC. These are the revision of member State reports, communications from 
individuals or groups of individuals and inter-state complaints.295 Communications from 
groups and individuals may only be revised after a State has made a declaration accepting this 
competence of the CERD. So far, 58 such declarations have been made. Half of the Latin 
American states have to date made such a declaration.296 The right to submit communications 
to the CERD denouncing a violation of the Convention applies to both groups and 
individuals.297 
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The CERD has addressed indigenous peoples’ land rights in many of its concluding 
observations on state reports.298 For example, in its concluding observations from 2007, it 
requested Costa Rica to ensure delimitation of indigenous lands in accordance with its 
national legislation.299  In its concluding observations on Chile from 2014, it urged Chile to 
implement mechanisms allowing for consultations with indigenous peoples in the event of 
decisions which may directly affect their rights to lands and resources.300  
Since 1993, the CERD has also had two types of extraordinary measures at hand. These 
measures include early warning measures and urgent procedures. Early warning measures aim 
to prevent an existing structural issue from escalating into a more serious one. The objective 
of urgent procedures is giving immediate attention to human rights violations in order to 
prevent more violations from taking place.301 These measures have on various occasions been 
used for protection of indigenous peoples’ rights related to their territories. 
For example, the CERD employed an urgent procedure with respect to Costa Rica in 
August 2013. The Committee made use of the procedure to address physical violence against 
indigenous peoples in Costa Rica and the illegal occupation of their territories. The 
Committee called on Costa Rica to adopt legislation providing protection to indigenous 
peoples’ rights to lands, territories and natural resources and to investigate the violent acts and 
punish their perpetrators.302  
Under the same procedure, it urged Peru to provide information on the effects which a 
specific gas-exploration and exploitation project might have on the rights of indigenous 
peoples living in voluntary isolation.303  
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It also urged Guyana in 2014 to implement the right of indigenous peoples to provide 
free, prior and informed consent before granting any mining concessions for mining projects 
which may affect lands to which these peoples possess rights.304 
The CERD further produces General Recommendations (GR) which have a similar 
function to the GCs produced by the HRC and the CESCR. In 1997, the CERD adopted the 
GR No. XXIII. on indigenous peoples. In this GR, the CERD reaffirms that indigenous 
peoples fall under the scope of the ICERD. It emphasises that the discrimination of 
indigenous peoples led to their dispossession of their territories to colonists, business 
enterprises and the States. Further, it urges States to respect indigenous peoples’ culture and 
their way of life and to prevent their discrimination.305 
2.1.2.5 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities 
Another instrument which also provides protection to indigenous peoples’ rights is the 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities.306 It was adopted by the UNGA in 1993. Just as Article 27 ICCPR, it 
applies to indigenous peoples’ land rights due to the cultural and religious aspects of 
indigenous peoples’ relationship with their lands.  
The Declaration claims to have taken inspiration in Article 27 of the ICCPR. In its 
Articles 2 and 3, it provides a list of individual rights of members belonging to national, 
ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic minorities, which can be exercised both individually 
and in community. Further, it sets out various obligations of states which are required to 
ensure these rights.307 
2.1.2.6 Convention on the Rights of the Child  
The CRC was adopted in 1989. It addresses indigenous children’s rights related to lands 
mainly – but not only – in its Article 30. This article anchors the right of indigenous children 
to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and speak their language, together with other 
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members of their community.308 According to GC No. 11 produced by the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, this right is also closely linked with the use of indigenous territories and 
resources. This is the case due to the importance of traditional lands for indigenous cultures 
and religions.309  
2.1.2.7 Convention on Biological Diversity 
In the Preamble, the CBD, which was adopted in 1992, points out the dependence of 
indigenous peoples on biological resources. Further, in its operative provisions, the CBD calls 
for States’ respect, preservation and maintenance of indigenous knowledge, practices and 
technologies for sustainable use of biological diversity. Moreover, it requires States to share 
the benefits produced as a result of the employment of this knowledge.310 
 
2.2 The Inter-American System of Human Rights 
This subchapter of Chapter 2 addresses the instruments of the IASHR.  
The first part of this subchapter focuses on the only instrument explicitly addressing 
indigenous peoples’ land rights within the IASHR – the American Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples.  
The second part of this subchapter presents instruments which do not deal with 
indigenous peoples’ land rights specifically. Those are the ACHR and the ADRDM. Due to 
the monitoring role of the IACtHR, the ACHR is absolutely crucial in this field. In addition, 
especially for States of the region which are not parties to the ACHR, the ADRDM plays an 
essential role as well.  
2.2.1 An instrument of the Inter-American System of Human Rights dealing specifically 
with indigenous peoples’ land rights – the American Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples 
This section provides an insight into the context of the adoption of ADRIP. At the point 
of the ADRIP’s endorsement by the OAS GA, the UNDRIP comprised the highest standards 
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in the field. This section thus compares these two instruments and points out ADRIP’s strong 
points and shortcomings. 
2.2.1.1 Adoption of the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
Within the IASHR, the topic of indigenous peoples’ rights is specifically dealt with in 
the ADRIP. The drafting process of the Declaration started in the same decade of the last 
century as that of ILO Convention 169 and the UNDRIP. More specifically, in November 
1989, the OAS General Assembly (hereinafter OAS GA) requested the IACmHR to start 
drafting the Declaration. The initial plan was to adopt the final text in 1992.311  
The UNDRIP served as a significant point of reference from the beginning of the 
drafting process.312 The IACmHR produced the Draft American Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (hereinafter DADRIP) in 1997.313 It was four years after the publishing of 
the first draft of the UNDRIP by the UN WGIP. The DADRIP was produced by experts with 
very limited participation of indigenous peoples. This trend also continued after the draft’s 
submission to the OAS General Assembly.314 Within the OAS GA, the DADRIP was 
considered by the Working Group established upon the incentive from the OAS GA.315  
A change was brought about only due to the pressure from indigenous organisations of 
the region.316 Eventually, in 2001, the OAS GA recommended a more substantial inclusion of 
indigenous representatives in the works on the DADRIP and an establishment of a voluntary 
fund facilitating their participation in the meetings.317  
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Finding an agreement on the text of the Declaration turned out to be very complicated, 
and various changes in the method of negotiations were required. The provisions of the text 
were divided into four categories depending on how easily consensus could be reached on 
them.318 In 2008, the delegations of Canada and the United States (also opposing countries of 
the UNDRIP at that point) withdrew from the negotiations. It was due to their disagreement 
with the direction of the negotiations of the DADRIP. They reserved their position on the 
final text.319  
Throughout the negotiations, some of the most contentious issues appeared to be the 
right to self-determination; restitution of property taken away without indigenous peoples’ 
free, prior and informed consent; the right of free, prior and informed consent concerning 
actions potentially affecting the environment on indigenous lands and territories, provisions 
on the rights to lands, territories and resources, and the right to development and peace and 
security in case of armed conflict.320 After all, this soft-law instrument specific for the region 
of the Americas was adopted by the General Assembly of the OAS in 2016.321  
It was adopted with four reservations included in the footnotes of the Declaration. One 
of them was made by the United States, which emphasised the legally non-binding status of 
the instrument. The second one was made by Canada, which pointed out that as it had not 
participated in the negotiations on the text, it could not take a position on the Declaration.  
The other two reservations were voiced by the representatives of Colombia. It objected 
to its provisions on free, prior and informed consent and military activities on indigenous 
territories. The Delegation of Colombia further submitted three notes of interpretation of six 
articles of the Declaration.322 
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2.2.1.2 Content of the ADRIP 
Unlike the UNDRIP, the ADRIP is structured into sections – the Preamble and six 
thematic sections. The Preamble of the ADRIP contains various provisions which exactly 
replicate those of the UNDRIP. Nevertheless, there are also various notable differences.  
The ADRIP addresses indigenous peoples as ‘peoples’, but it does not explicitly affirm 
their status as peoples. The UNDRIP does so in the Preamble. Furthermore, in contrast to the 
UNDRIP, the ADRIP does not mention the right to self-determination in the Preamble and 
thus does not make it a guiding principle of the entire instrument.323 
Whereas the UNDRIP stipulates that ‘indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples 
while recognising the right of all peoples to be different (…) and to be respected as such’, the 
ADRIP states that ‘indigenous peoples are original, diverse societies with their own identities 
that constitute an integral part of the Americas’. The UNDRIP moreover emphasises in the 
Preamble that indigenous peoples are entitled to collective rights. The ADRIP does not do so. 
The first section contains provisions on the scope of application of the Declaration and 
on self-determination. Like the UNDRIP, it puts self-identification and indigenous practices 
as the principal criterion for identification of the indigenous peoples.324 As opposed to the 
UNDRIP, it does not make any mention of the right to obtain citizenship of the states in 
which they live.325  
The provisions on self-determination are identical with those of the UNDRIP, even 
placed in the same article – Article 3. However, the ADRIP puts the restrictive provision 
addressing the territorial integrity of States directly after the right to self-determination. The 
UNDRIP instead goes on to elaborate on indigenous peoples’ right to autonomy and self-
government.326  
The UN Declaration includes the exact same restrictive provision, only incorporates it 
in its penultimate article. Furthermore, whereas the UNDRIP contains provisions on the right 
 
323 YÁÑEZ FUENZALIDA, Nancy. Analysis: OAS’s American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
[online]. Copenhagen: IWGIA, 2016 (accessed on 20 April 2020). Available at: https://www.iwgia.org/en/news-
alerts/archive?view=article&id=2417:analysis-oass-american-declaration-on-the-rights-o&catid=150. 
324 ADRIP, Articles I. (2.) and VIII. 
325 UNDRIP, Article 33. 
326 YÁÑEZ FUENZALIDA, Nancy. Analysis: OAS’s American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
[online]. Copenhagen: IWGIA, 2016 (accessed on 20 April 2020). Available at: https://www.iwgia.org/en/news-
alerts/archive?view=article&id=2417:analysis-oass-american-declaration-on-the-rights-o&catid=150. 
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of indigenous peoples to live as distinct peoples,327 the ADRIP stresses that indigenous 
peoples are an integral part of their societies.328 
Section two of the ADRIP recognises that indigenous peoples possess collective rights. 
It uses the exact same wording as does the UNDRIP in the Preamble. Unlike the UNDRIP’s 
Preamble, it goes on to specify that this applies to their institutions, cultures, spiritual beliefs, 
languages, and also indigenous peoples’ lands, territories and resources.329  
The second section also incorporates provisions forbidding assimilation, racial 
discrimination and stresses the prohibition of any form of genocide330 – provisions also 
included in the UNDRIP.  
The ADRIP differs from the UNDRIP by incorporating provisions on issues especially 
relevant for the IASHR.331 It addresses gender equality and stresses the necessity of 
prevention of violence, especially against indigenous women.332 Also, it requires states to 
recognise indigenous peoples’ right to legal personality.333 This right is also included in the 
ACHR334 and is addressed in the IACtHR’s case-law in the context of indigenous peoples’ 
communal property rights to lands.335 
Just as the UNDRIP, the ADRIP addresses indigenous cultural heritage, spirituality and 
traditional knowledge, and their protection, maintenance and development.336 These rights are 
included in section three along with rights related to autonomous and culturally and 
linguistically appropriate education and indigenous media of communication.337  
 
327 UNDRIP, Article 7. 
328 CLAVERO, Bartolomé. La Declaración Americana sobre Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas: el reto de la 
interpretación de una norma contradictoria. Pensamiento Constitucional. 2016, 26, p. 17; ADRIP, Article II. 
329 ADRIP, Article VI. 
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331 REGINO MONTES, Adelfo. SERVICIOS DEL PUEBLO MIXE. Organización de los Estados Americanos 
aprobó la Declaración Americana sobre los Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas [online]. Cultural Survival, 
2016 (accessed on 10 May 2020). Available at: https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/organizacion-de-los-
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333 ADRIP, Article IX.  
334 ACHR, Article 3. 
335 IACtHR. Case of Saramaka People v. Suriname. Judgement of November 28, 2007, paras 159-175. 
336 ADRIP, Articles XIII, XIV, XVI. 
337 ADRIP, Articles XIC and XV. 
 63 
The third section further includes provisions on the recognition, respect and protection 
of various indigenous forms of family,338 a right not included in the UNDRIP.  
The ADRIP follows the UNDRIP by including specific provisions on indigenous 
peoples’ right to ‘the highest attainable standard of physical, mental, and spiritual health’.339 
It formulates this right as both individual and collective, as opposed to the UN Declaration, 
which construes it as an individual right. As to the right to a healthy environment also 
included in this section, the ADRIP employs wording very similar to the UNDRIP.  
Nevertheless, unlike the UNDRIP, the ADRIP does not condition the placement of 
hazardous materials on indigenous peoples’ territories upon their free, prior and informed 
consent. Instead, it sets out indigenous peoples’ ‘right to be protected against the introduction 
(…) of any harmful substance’ for indigenous communities, lands, territories and resources.340 
Section four anchors indigenous peoples’ right to assembly, association, and expression 
in keeping with their culture. Moreover, it addresses their right to autonomy and self-
government concerning their own matters as a part of their right to self-determination. The 
provisions are fairly similar to those of the UNDRIP.  
However, there is one noteworthy difference between the two declarations regarding 
indigenous peoples’ participation. The UNDRIP anchors both the right of indigenous peoples 
to their own institutions and decision-making over their own, internal matters, as well as their 
right to participate in the decision-making of the state ‘if they so choose’.341 The ADRIP does 
not include any such opt-out formulation.342  
Where these declarations also differ, are the provisions on the indigenous jurisdiction. 
While the UNDRIP incorporates provisions on the recognition of indigenous land tenure 
systems,343 it does not contain a general requirement that indigenous legal systems are 
recognised. The ADRIP includes a landmark provision on indigenous jurisdiction. It 
 
338 ADRIP, Article XVII. 
339 ADRIP, Article XVIII. 
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341 UNDRIP, Articles 4 and 5. 
342 CLAVERO, Bartolomé. La Declaración Americana sobre Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas: el reto de la 
interpretación de una norma contradictoria. Pensamiento Constitucional. 2016 (26), p. 16. 
343 UNDRIP, Article 40. 
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incorporates indigenous peoples’ right to maintain their ‘juridical systems and customs’ as 
long as they comply with international human rights standards. It also anchors the 
corresponding states’ obligation to recognise and respect these systems.344  
As to provisions on indigenous peoples’ participation in decision-making over matters 
which may affect them, both declarations set out states’ obligation to consult and cooperate in 
good faith with indigenous peoples represented by their own institutions ‘in order to obtain 
their free, prior and informed consent’.345  
Section four also deals with indigenous peoples’ ‘treaties, agreements and other 
constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors’.346 A part of the 
provision is exactly the same as the corresponding provision of the UNDRIP. The ADRIP’s 
version, however, sets out the recognition, observance and enforcement of these treaties ‘in 
accordance with their true spirit and intent in good faith’ and requires States to take into 
account indigenous peoples’ understanding of these treaties.347 In addition, the article 
envisages the resolution of disputes arising under these treaties by ‘competent bodies, 
including regional and international bodies’.348 Such a provision adds a potential 
international dimension to such disputes.349 
Interestingly, one of the draft versions of the UNDRIP while it was still in the WGIP, 
included provisions on adherence to treaties with indigenous peoples ‘according to their 
original intent’. It also included a provision on the dispute resolution by ‘competent 
international bodies’.350 They were, however, taken out during subsequent negotiations in the 
political bodies. On the other hand, the DADRIP adopted by the IACmHR in 1997 only 
included the wording ‘competent bodies’.351 
 
344 ADRIP, Article XXIII. 
345 ADRIP, Article XXIII (2); UNDRIP, Article 19. 
346 ADRIP, Article XXIV (1) 
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Section five of the ADRIP addresses social, economic and property rights, part of which 
are also the rights to lands, territories and resources. These are contained in Article XXV. Its 
wording is very similar to Article 25 of the UNDRIP. It, however, sees the indigenous 
peoples’ distinctive relationship with their lands, territories and resources not only as spiritual 
but also as cultural and material.  
The ADRIP echoes the UNDRIP by recognising indigenous peoples’ – unspecified – 
‘right to lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or 
otherwise used or acquired’. In the following paragraph which specifies this right, it, 
however, also – just as the UNDRIP – employs the present tense. It, thus, incorporates 
indigenous peoples’ right to ‘own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and 
resources’ which they currently possess.352 Unlike the UNDRIP, it does not, however, require 
States to establish mechanisms of recognition of lands, territories and resources traditionally 
owned, occupied or used in the past.353  
The ADRIP also envisages recognition of ‘the various and particular modalities and 
forms of property, possession and ownership of their [indigenous peoples’] lands, territories 
and resources’. It sets itself apart from the UNDRIP by setting out the requirement that this 
be in line with each State’s legal system and international law.354  
The requirement of conformity with states’ national legislation has been an object of 
wide criticism, as it is regressive with respect to both the UNDRIP and the case-law of the 
IACtHR.355 According to the Court’s case-law States are obliged to recognise indigenous 
peoples’ customary forms of land ownership.356  
 
352 ADRIP, Article XXV (1), (2). 
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Where the ADRIP also deviates from both the IACtHR’s case-law and the UNDRIP, is 
the right of indigenous peoples to restitution or compensation for lands, territories and 
resources which they had possessed in the past and of which they have been deprived.357  
Even though it does contain a provision on the restitution of property, it is not included 
in the article addressing land rights, but in an article dealing with cultural identity. This 
provision, moreover, speaks only of restitution of ‘cultural, intellectual, religious and 
spiritual property taken without their free, prior and informed consent (…)’.358 In 
comparison, the UNDRIP also contains such a provision on the restitution of cultural 
property.359 In addition to that, it, however, also incorporates a provision which speaks 
specifically of redress by means of restitution, and when not possible, compensation ‘for 
lands, territories and resources’.360  
Moreover, the ADRIP does not contain any provision on the prohibition of the 
relocation of indigenous peoples from their lands or territories and on conditions for situations 
in which such a relocation does take place. Neither does it enshrine the right to return once the 
grounds for the relocation cease to exist. Such a provision was included in the draft version of 
the American Declaration, but it was removed one year before the adoption of the 
Declaration.361 This provision is contained both in ILO Convention 169362 and the 
UNDRIP.363  
The American Declaration, on the other hand, noticeably reflects the case-law of the 
IACtHR by incorporating the obligations of demarcation and titling of indigenous peoples’ 
lands.364 
 
357 See, UNDRIP, Article 28; IACtHR. Case of the Moiwana Community. IACtHR, Judgement of June 15, 2005 
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Section five of the ADRIP further contains provisions on the respect and protection of 
indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation, including their right to remain so. This provision is 
unique to the American Declaration and reflects the situation in the region.365  
The fifth section also deals with the right to development. This ADRIP enshrines 
indigenous peoples’ right to maintain and determine their own priorities with respect to their 
development.366 This formulation gives indigenous peoples a little more leeway than that of 
the UNDRIP. The UN Declaration formulates this right as ‘the right to maintain and develop 
their political, economic and social systems or institutions’.367  
The ADRIP also (like the UNDRIP) requires the states to ‘consult and cooperate in 
good faith with indigenous peoples concerned (…) in order to obtain their free and informed 
consent’ prior to carrying out or approving any projects related to natural resources.368 Also, 
like the UN Declaration, it incorporates provisions on restitution or alternatively 
compensation, in case indigenous peoples are deprived of their means of subsistence and 
development.369  
Unlike the UNDRIP, the ADRIP further contains provisions on the protection of 
indigenous peoples and their human rights, including their lands, territories and resources in 
the event of armed conflict.370  
It also prohibits military activities on indigenous territories, with the exception of 
relevant public interest and indigenous peoples’ free consent or request. This part of the 
provision is very similar to the wording of the UNDRIP. Unlike the UNDRIP, however, it 
does not incorporate provisions on effective consultations which shall be carried out in the 
event that military activities are to be carried out.371 
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Section six contains general provisions. This section of the ADRIP comprises a 
provision on the respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms while exercising the 
rights affirmed in it. It is the same provision which was also included in the UNDRIP possibly 
as a means to protect the rights of the owners of lands claimed by indigenous peoples.372  
Finally, an identical version of an article preventing any interpretation which would 
diminish indigenous peoples’ both current and future rights is included both in the ADRIP 
and the UNDRIP.373 It seems that due to the retrograde features of the ADRIP in comparison 
with the UNDRIP, such a provision may be of increased value in the former. 
2.2.1.3 Conclusions on the ADRIP 
It seemed that the ADRIP had many prerequisites to become the flagship instrument of 
international law on indigenous peoples’ rights. The IASHR human rights bodies have 
already laid the foundations for the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights. Indigenous 
peoples’ rights are also anchored in national constitutions of many Latin-American states.374 
The US and Canada withdrew from the negotiations of the ADRIP. This means that the two 
of the loudest opposing voices throughout the negotiations of the UNDRIP did not participate 
in the ADRIP negotiations. Moreover, the UNDRIP had already been adopted and served as a 
strong point of departure.  
Yet, the instrument incorporates various provisions which are regressive towards the 
already established standards. It emphasises that indigenous peoples form an integral part of 
national societies.375 It requires that indigenous forms of ownership be in keeping with 
national laws to be eligible for recognition by States.376 It does not mention indigenous 
peoples’ right to restitution of their traditionally used lands, territories and resources, nor any 
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restriction on their relocation from their lands and their right to return. Moreover, it does not 
establish any means for indigenous peoples to prevent the placement of harmful substances on 
their territories.  
It thus seems that indigenous peoples’ lower chance of participation in the process of 
drafting as compared to the UNDRIP377 may have also affected the level of standards 
anchored in the instrument. 
On the other hand, the ADRIP contains provisions which are not included in any other 
instrument of international law on indigenous peoples’ rights.378 Some of them based on the 
case-law of the IACtHR and some of them specifically reflecting the context of the region. It 
encompasses the obligation of demarcation and titling of indigenous peoples’ lands. It 
incorporates states’ obligation to recognise indigenous peoples’ right to legal personality – a 
right crucial for indigenous peoples’ land rights.379 
The ADRIP further anchors indigenous peoples’ right to health as both individual and 
collective one. It contains provisions on indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation. It also 
entrenches the protection of indigenous peoples in the situation of armed conflict. 
Additionally, its provision on treaties between states and indigenous peoples constitutes a 
significant leap forward with respect to the UNDRIP. 
After all, even with all its shortcomings, now, there is a special instrument of 
international law symbolising the commitment of the Inter-American region to the 
improvement of the position the indigenous peoples.380 It has, moreover, already found its 
way into the case-law of the IACtHR.381 
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2.2.2 Relevant instruments of the Inter-American System of Human Rights not 
specifically addressing indigenous peoples’ land rights  
This section deals with the two instruments of the IASHR which provide protection to 
indigenous peoples’ land rights but do not mention them – the ADRDM and the ACHR. The 
text presents an overview of relevant provisions of these instruments.  
Also, it provides the context of some of the cases before the IACmHR and IACtHR 
concerning indigenous peoples’ land rights in which these bodies found a violation of the 
aforementioned provisions. 
2.2.2.1 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man together with the 
Charter of the Organisation of American States 
Another instrument of the IASHR, which provides protection to indigenous peoples’ 
rights is the ADRDM adopted in 1948. The Declaration was initially a non-binding soft law 
instrument. Nevertheless, according to the case-law of both the IACtHR and the IACmHR, 
the Declaration defines the human rights referred to in the OAS Charter and is thus now a 
source of legal obligations for all OAS member states.382  
The IACtHR has also addressed the competence of the IACmHR to monitor States’ 
observance of the obligations set out in the ADRDM. Based on the Court’s interpretation of 
the OAS Charter383 in conjunction with the IACmHR Statute,384 the IACmHR is authorised to 
examine petitions which claim violations of the ADRDM by those States which are not a 
party to the ACHR.385 The ADRDM, therefore, plays an especially important role for the 
member states of the OAS which are not a party to the ACHR.386  
 
382 IACtHR. Interpretation of the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework of Article 
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para 85. 
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It follows from the decisions of both the IACtHR as well as the IACmHR that the most 
relevant provisions of the ADRDM for indigenous peoples’ land rights are those of Article I. 
(the right to life, liberty and personal security),387 Article II. (the right to equality before law), 
Article VIII. (the right to residence and movement),388 Article XI. (the right to the 
preservation of health and to well-being),389 and Article XXIII. (the right to property).390 
A landmark case before the IACmHR concerning indigenous peoples’ land rights was 
the Yanomami v. Brazil.391 This case concerned the Yanomami indigenous community living 
in the Brazilian Amazon region.392  
The State constructed a highway which crossing through the Yanomamis’ ancestral 
territory. Further, it allowed for invasions of third parties into this territory. Among these 
people were construction workers, mining prospectors and farmworkers intending to settle in 
the area. This invasion led to epidemics of various diseases within the community, such as 
influenza and tuberculosis, resulting in numerous deaths.393  
Moreover, the discovery of metals on the territory brought about violent conflicts 
between the miners and the Yanomamis, interfering with the lives, health, security and 
cultural identity of the community.394 
The Commission found violations of various rights of the ADRDM. Namely, it declared 
a violation of the right to life, liberty and personal security under Article I., the right to 
residence and movement under Article VIII., and the right to the preservation of health and to 
well-being under Article XI.395 
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2.2.2.2 American Convention on Human Rights  
An instrument of international law crucial for indigenous peoples’ land rights is the 
American Convention on Human Rights. Even though the Convention does not explicitly 
mention indigenous peoples, its application on indigenous property rights follows from the 
jurisprudence of the IACtHR. Due to its binding nature and the IACtHR’s role as a 
monitoring body, it is one of the essential instruments providing protection to these rights.  
The IACtHR rules on cases concerning the interpretation or application of the ACHR 
which are submitted to it by any State party to the ACHR or by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. It is authorised to decide over cases against States which have 
either permanently recognised its jurisdiction or which have declared their recognition of its 
jurisdiction in a special agreement.396 For States party to ACHR which have not accepted the 
Court’s jurisdiction, the monitoring role is carried out by the IACmHR.397  
Out of 20 Latin-American States, only Cuba is not a state party to the ACHR. All 19 
state parties except the Dominican Republic have accepted the jurisdiction of the IACtHR.398 
It follows from the Court’s case-law that for the interpretation of the provisions of the 
ACHR, the Court also takes in to account other instruments of international law, which can 
shed light on the issue in question. The IACtHR came to this conclusion based on Article 
29(b) of the ACHR. According to this provision, the level of protection offered by the ACHR 
may not be more restrictive than that provided by the national law or any other international 
instrument which applies to the relevant State.399 
Out of the provisions of the ACHR, Article 21 of the Convention (the right to property) 
has played a fundamental role in the protection of indigenous peoples’ land rights in the 
region of Latin America.400  
 
396 ACHR, Articles 61, 62. 
397 This follows from Article 1 of the IACmHR Statute (OAS, Statute of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, 1 October 1979, Resolution No. 447); ACHR, Articles 41(f) and 44. 
398 DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, OAS. AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
"PACT OF SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA" (B-32): Signatories and Ratifications [online]. San Jose, Costa Rica: 
OAS, 2014 (accessed on 12 May 2020). Available at: https://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-
32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm#Argentina. 
399 Yakye Axa, paras 127-130. 
400 This right is the subject of Chapter 3. 
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Other provisions which have been invoked in the context of indigenous peoples’ land 
rights are that of the right to juridical personality under Article 3,401 the right to life under 
Article 4, and the right to judicial protection under Article 25.402 Most recently, the Court also 
applied Article 26 on progressive development.  
The right to juridical personality is enshrined in Article 3 of the ACHR. It represents 
every person’s right to recognition as a person before the law and provides the basis for one’s 
right to have rights.403 The IACtHR has held that in order to guarantee indigenous peoples 
their right to own ancestral lands in a communal manner, the juridical personality of the 
indigenous or tribal community must be recognised.404 
The IACtHR addressed the right to life in the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. 
Paraguay. In this case, the State failed to enforce the right of the Sawhoyamaxa indigenous 
peoples to their lands. Paraguayan laws do recognize indigenous peoples’ right to communal 
property rights. The ownership of the claimed lands had, however, been conveyed to a third 
party. The Sawhoyamaxa community started claiming their rights to these lands which form a 
part of their ancestral territory in 1993.405 The State did not return these lands, nor did it 
provide the community with alternative ones.406  
As a result, the community was denied access to these ancestral lands and lived on the 
side of a public road in atrocious conditions. Due to the lack of access to their traditional way 
of subsistence and the lack of medical care and water, many of the members of the 
Sawhoyamaxa community died of preventable diseases and malnutrition. The Court thus 
found that the State could have prevented this situation by returning the traditional lands to 
the community within a reasonable time or by providing them with alternative ones. By 
failing to adopt adequate measures, the State violated the right to life of various members of 
the community anchored in Article 4 of the ACHR.407  
 
401 Saramaka, para 172. 
402 Awas Tingni, paras 115, 127 and 137-139. 
403 STEINER, Christian and Marie-Christine FUCHS, ed. Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos: 
Comentario. 2nd edn. Bogotá: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V., 2019, p. 110. 
404 Saramaka, paras 172. 
405 Sawhoyamaxa, paras 135-144. 
406 For more information on the obligations of the State with respect to indigenous peoples’ lands ancestral lands 
which have been conveyed to third parties, see section 3.2.7. 
407 Sawhoyamaxa, paras 156-178. 
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The right to judicial protection grounded in Article 25 of the Convention has also been 
applied in the context of protection of indigenous peoples’ land rights. It comprises the right 
of everyone to an effective judicial remedy. The IACtHR has interpreted this right specifically 
in the context of indigenous peoples’ property rights. It ruled that it embodies the obligation 
of States to establish a legal procedure which enables the delimitation, demarcation and titling 
of indigenous peoples’ lands.408  
In its most recent judgement related to indigenous peoples’ land rights, Lhaka Honhat 
Association v. Argentina, the IACtHR addressed claimes under Article 26 on progressive 
development. In this case, various issues arose under a few different rights, all under the 
scope of Article 26. Namely, it was the right to a healthy environment, adequate food, water, 
and to take part in cultural life. It was the first time that the IACtHR addressed these rights in 
a contentious case as stand-alone rights under Article 26.409 
Article 26 ACHR is the only provision of Chapter III. ACHR. This Chapter is entitled 
‘economic, social and cultural rights’. The article enshrines the obligation of the State parties 
to the ACHR to undertake measures in order to progressively achieve the economic, social, 
educational, scientific and cultural standards grounded in the OAS Charter.  
The case concerned various indigenous communities which, from 1991, had been 
together claiming their rights to their ancestral lands. Argentina took some partial steps to 
ensure the rights of these communities to their lands. However, until the judgement of the 
IACtHR in February 2020, it failed to properly implement them.410  
For 28 years, Argentina did neither issue a title deed to these communities, nor did it 
demarcate their lands. It also did not relocate third parties from them. In the meantime, third 
parties carried out illegal wood-logging, installed fences and reared cattle on these 
territories.411  
The stockbreeding and forestry affected the environment of the territories and the 
communities’ access to water. It also interfered with their traditional means of subsistence. 
 
408 Awas Tingni, paras 115, 127 and 137-139. 
409 IACtHR. Caso Comunidades indígenas miembros de la asociación Lhaka Honhat (Nuestra tierra) vs. 
Argentina, Resumen oficial emitido por la Corte Interamericana, Sentencia de 6 de Febrero de 2020, part III.b. 
410 Lhaka Honhat Association, para 287. 
411 Lhaka Honhat Association, para 287. 
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According to the Court, this interference with the indigenous communities’ traditional 
resources led to harm to their cultural identity.412 
The IACtHR addressed the claims under all these rights together due to their 
interrelatedness. It found support for its ruling under these rights in many instruments of 
international law, including the documents produced by the UN treaty-monitoring bodies 
mentioned in Chapter 2.1.2.  
The Court found the basis for the application of the right to a healthy environment under 
Article 26 ACHR in its Advisory Opinion OC-23/17. In this advisory opinion, The IACtHR 
held that ‘a healthy environment is a fundamental right for the existence of humankind’.413 It 
also concluded that the right to a healthy environment falls under Article 26 ACHR.414  
For the right to adequate food, the IACtHR found support in the GC No. 12 of the 
CESCR on the right to adequate food. With respect to the right to water, the Court referred to 
the CESCR’s GC on the right to water. Regarding the right to take part in cultural life, the 
Court based its observations, among others, on the CESCR’s GC No. 21 on the right to take 
part in cultural life. Also, it referred to the GC No. 23 of the HRC, on the rights of 
minorities.415 
Finally, the IACtHR concluded that the State failed to ensure the right of the indigenous 
communities to control the activities on their ancestral territory. As a result, the rights of these 
communities to a healthy environment, adequate food, water, and to take part in cultural life 
under Article 26 of the ACHR were violated.416 
These findings of the Court are rather progressive. However, there seems to be plausible 
grounding for them. The provision of Article 26 of the ACHR foresees progressive 
development. Argentina is a party to the ICCPR,417 ICESCR,418 and the ILO Convention 
 
412 Lhaka Honhat Association, para 284. 
413 IACtHR. Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, November 14, 2017 (hereinafter OC-23/17), para 59. 
414 OC 23/17, para 56. 
415 Lhaka Honhat Association, paras 202-289. 
416 Lhaka Honhat Association, para 289. 
417 This instrument anchors the rights of minorities. (See section 2.1.2.2 on the ICCPR) 
418 This instrument anchors the right to water, adequate food and the right to take part in cultural life. (See 
section 2.1.2.3 on the ICESCR). 
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169.419 The rights which were violated in this case are anchored in these instruments. 
Moreover, it follows from the previous well-established case-law of the IACtHR that the 
Court is authorised to take other international law instruments, which apply to the State party 
to the case, into account when interpreting the ACHR.420  
Now, the IACtHR’s jurisprudence also reflects the interconnectedness between 
indigenous peoples’ rights to their territories, and their right to adequate food, water, healthy 
environment and culture. 
 
3. Property rights as a basis for the protection of indigenous 
peoples’ land rights in the case-law of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights 
The focal point of Chapter 3 are property rights. The first part of this chapter provides 
the background for where indigenous peoples’ right to own their lands is grounded.  
Subsequently, the second part presents the jurisprudence of the IACtHR on indigenous 
peoples’ land rights under Article 21 of the ACHR enshrining the right to property.421  
3.1 Indigenous peoples’ property rights 
Indigenous peoples’ collective form of land ownership is distinct from the classical 
concept of the individual right to private property (dominium).422  
Gilbert points out that indigenous peoples’ claim for recognition of their collective 
property rights poses a challenge for human rights law.423 Recently, indigenous peoples’ 
 
419 This instrument anchors indigenous peoples’ environmental rights. See, ŽÁKOVSKÁ, Karolina. Práva 
domorodých národů jako nástroj ochrany životního prostředí [Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a tool for 
environmental protection]. ŠTURMA, Pavel a Karolina ŽÁKOVSKÁ, ed. Od zákazu diskriminace k ochraně 
kolektivních práv. 1. Prague: Univerzita Karlova, Právnická fakulta v nakl. Eva Rozkotová, 2014, p. 81. 
420 For more information on the evolutive interpretation employed in the case-law of the IACtHR, see Section 
3.2.2. 
421 For an overview of findings of the IACtHR on this issue, see Annexe I. 
422 GILBERT, Jérémie. Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors. 
Netherlands: Brill | Nijhoff, 2007, p. 88; ‘Among indigenous peoples there is a communitarian tradition 
regarding a communal form of collective property of the land, in the sense that ownership of the land is not 
centered on an individual but rather on the group and its community.’ Awas Tingni, para 149. 
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communal property rights have been increasingly gaining recognition within international 
human rights law.  
The obligation of states to recognise indigenous peoples’ right to own their lands is 
enshrined in ILO Conventions 107 and 169, and the UN and the American Declarations.424 
Only the oldest instrument, ILO Convention 107, speaks of individual ownership rights.425 All 
of the newer instruments fully recognise the communal aspect of indigenous land tenure and 
omit any mention of individual property rights. ILO Convention 169, the UNDRIP and the 
ADRIP further acknowledge the significance of the special collective relationship of 
indigenous peoples to their lands.426  
All four of these instruments in some way also anchor the rights of indigenous peoples 
with respect to measures which may affect them, including development projects carried out 
on their territories or their relocation from their traditional lands. The latter three instruments 
do so in a significantly more progressive manner.427  
These three instruments also mention the rights of indigenous peoples to natural 
resources. The two Declarations, moreover, specify that indigenous peoples have the right to 
own them.428 
 The right of indigenous peoples to own their lands is also grounded in Article 21 of 
the ACHR. The Article reads:  
‘1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may 
subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society.  
2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, 
for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms 
established by law.  
 
423 GILBERT, Jérémie. Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors. 
Netherlands: Brill | Nijhoff, 2007, p. 88. 
424 ILO Convention 107, Article 11; ILO Convention 169, Article 14; UNDRIP, Articles 26 and 27; ADRIP, 
Article XXV. 
425 ILO Convention 107, Article 11. 
426 ILO Convention 169, Article 13; UNDRIP, Articles 1, 25, and 26; ADRIP, Articles VI. and XXV. 
427 ILO Convention 107, Article 12; ILO Convention 169, Articles 15, 16; UNDRIP, Articles 10, 19, 29, 30, 32. 
428 ILO Convention 169, Article 15; UNDRIP, Articles 25-28; ADRIP, Article XXV. 
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3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited by 
law.’429  
Paragraph 1 of Article 21 anchors the content of the right to property and sets out 
conditions for its restriction. These conditions are further elaborated on in paragraph 2.  
Interestingly, all the versions of this instrument except the English one incorporate the 
right under Article 21 as the right to private property. Nevertheless, the IACtHR has 
developed a complex body of jurisprudence according to which indigenous peoples’ 
communal property rights to their lands also fall under the scope of this article. 
3.2 Case-law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on indigenous 
peoples’ land rights under Article 21 
Due to the jurisprudence of the IACtHR, the right to property has become the central 
pillar of the protection of indigenous peoples’ land rights in Latin America. The IACtHR has 
step by step developed a complex set of rights of indigenous peoples and the corresponding 
obligations of States under Article 21 of the ACHR. The following sections analyse the 
content of this case-law. 
3.2.1 Indigenous peoples’ collective spiritual relationship to their lands 
For indigenous peoples, their lands, territories and resources do not merely constitute a 
source of subsistence, but also form an essential part of their culture and religion. Indigenous 
peoples have a profound spiritual connection with their ancestral lands and live in harmony 
with their environment.430 Indigenous peoples’ collective relationship with their ancestral 
lands plays an essential role in their physical and mental health and the perpetuation of their 
culture.431  
The IACtHR has recognised the fundamentality of this spiritual relationship for 
indigenous peoples’ current and future existence and emphasised the importance of protection 
of their collective property rights over their lands under the scope of Article 21 of the ACHR 
in its jurisprudence.  
 
429 ACHR, Article 21. 
430 DANNENMAIER, Eric. Beyond Indigenous Property Rights: Exploring the Emergence of a Distinctive 
Connection Doctrine. Washington University Law Review. 2008, 86(1), 86-7. 
431 IACmHR. Case of Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District, Report No. 40/04 of 12 October 
2004, para 155. 
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According to the Court, ‘the close ties of indigenous people with the land must be 
recognised and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their 
integrity, and their economic survival. For indigenous communities, relations to the land are 
not merely a matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual element which 
they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future 
generations’.432  
In the case of Saramaka v. Suriname, the IACtHR affirmed the dependency of the very 
survival of indigenous and tribal peoples on the safeguarding of this relationship.433 
3.2.2 Protection of indigenous peoples’ communal land rights under Article 21 ACHR 
Indigenous peoples’ concept of collective land tenure does not map onto the concept of 
private property exactly. Right to property is anchored in Article 21 of the ACHR, but its 
wording does not mention any collective element of this right. The IACtHR has, however, 
interpreted this provision as inclusive of indigenous peoples’ communal ownership.  
This follows from the IACtHR’s landmark judgement in the case of the Mayagna 
(Sumo) Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua. The Court, using evolutionary interpretation, interpreted 
Article 21 in light of the provision anchored in Article 29(b) ACHR.  
According to this provision, no right enshrined in the ACHR can be interpreted in a way 
which is more restrictive of such right, than provisions of another convention to which the 
respective State is a party or than the State’s national laws. As a basis, it referred to the 
recognition of indigenous collective property rights in the Nicaraguan Constitution.434  
The IACtHR reiterated this argumentation in various subsequent cases. As a source of 
recognition of indigenous peoples’ communal ownership under property rights, the Court 
relied both on provisions of states’ national law (if they recognised indigenous peoples’ 
collective property rights), as well as on international treaties (in particular Article 11 of the 
 
432 Awas Tingni, para 149. 
433 Saramaka, paras 90 and 122. 
434 Awas Tingni, para 148. 
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ILO 107 Convention435 and Article 13 of the ILO 169 Convention436) if respective states were 
state parties to these treaties.  
The IACtHR reiterated this position in its judgement in the case of Yakye Axa v. 
Paraguay.437 The Court took into consideration the provisions of ILO Convention 169. In 
particular, it relied on provisions enshrining the collective relationship of indigenous peoples 
with their lands and the importance of these lands for their cultural survival.  
Eventually, the Court confirmed that Article 21 also protects these collective ties of 
indigenous peoples with their lands.438 The IACtHR further dealt with indigenous peoples’ 
collective property rights under Article 21 of the ACHR in the case of indigenous 
communities Kuna of Madungandí and Emberá of Bayano.  
In this case, the Court further held that Article 21 needs to be interpreted in light of ILO 
Convention 169, the UNDRIP, other instruments and decisions of international bodies, as 
well as national laws, which altogether form the corpus iuris which defines the obligations of 
state parties under the ACHR.439  
In the case of Moiwana v. Suriname, the Court applied Article 21 ACHR as a basis for 
the recognition of tribal peoples’ property rights without a reference to neither the ILO 
Conventions nor Surinamese national laws. Suriname was not (and still is not) a party to 
neither of the two ILO Conventions related to indigenous people’s land rights. Also, 
Surinamese national legislation did not (and still does not) recognise collective property 
rights.440  
The Court included the tribal peoples’ communal land rights under the scope of Article 
21 solely based on the provisions of this article and its previous interpretation in its 
jurisprudence.441 This judgement consolidated the inclusion of indigenous peoples’ communal 
 
435 IACtHR. Case of the Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandí and the Emberá Indigenous People of Bayano 
and their members v. Panama. Judgement of October 14, 2014 (Kuna of Madungandí and Emberá of Bayano), 
para 116. 
436 Yakye Axa, paras 130-137. 
437 Yakye Axa, para 137. 
438 Yakye Axa, para 127 et seq. 
439 Kuna of Madungandí and Emberá of Bayano, para 113; IACtHR. Case of the Community Garífuna Triunfo 
de la Cruz and its members v. Honduras. Judgement of October 8, 2015 (Garífuna Triunfo de la Cruz), para 103. 
440 Moiwana, para 86(5). 
441 Moiwana, paras 125-134. 
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property rights under Article 21 ACHR independently of a State’s ratification of the two ILO 
Conventions and its national laws.  
However, it should be noted that the Court developed this interpretation of Article 21 
based on the national law of one State – Nicaragua. Subsequently, it applied it when deciding 
on the obligations of another state – Suriname. As has been mentioned, unlike Nicaragua, 
Suriname had not implemented legislation underpinning indigenous peoples’ communal 
property rights. The argumentation of the Court in this case is therefore problematic.  
A question arises whether, had the Moiwana case come before the IACtHR first, the 
Court would have reached the same conclusion. In its subsequent judgement against 
Suriname, the Court based the obligation of Suriname to recognise indigenous peoples’ 
communal property rights on Article 21 ACHR, interpreted in light of Article 1 common to 
the Covenants (right to self-determination) and Article 27 of the ICCPR (rights of minorities), 
to which Suriname is a State party.442 
3.2.3 Recognition of traditional possession as a title 
As regards the recognition of indigenous peoples’ property rights in the event that they 
lack a real title to the relevant land, the Court further held in the aforementioned Awas Tingni 
case, that indigenous peoples’ customs and traditional use need to be taken into account when 
assessing the existence of property rights.  
According to the Court, traditional possession of land suffices as a title for the 
recognition and subsequent registration of these rights.443 In the case of Xucuru v. Brazil, the 
IACtHR further specified that the traditional possession of lands by indigenous peoples has 
the exact same effects as a title deed issued by the State.444  
 
442 IACtHR. Case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, Judgement of November 25, 2015 (Kaliña and 
Lokono), paras 122-125. 
443 Awas Tingni, para 151. 
444 Xucuru, para 117. 
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Based on this finding of the IACtHR, it can be argued that indigenous peoples’ 
communal property rights exist regardless of the State’s act of titling them; such act of titling 
is declaratory.445  
3.2.4 The right to demarcation, delimitation, titling, effective control and permanent use 
The recognition of indigenous peoples’ long-term traditional possession of lands as 
equal to a real title is only the first in a set of obligations of States concerning indigenous 
communal property rights.  
In the case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, the Court held that to 
ensure indigenous peoples’ full enjoyment of their property rights over their lands, states are 
obliged to adopt a procedure which will allow these rights to materialise.446  
The Awas Tingni case concerned an indigenous community of over six hundred 
members traditionally inhabiting lands in the northern part of the Pacific coast of Nicaragua. 
The indigenous community did not have a title deed to the lands which they inhabited, but 
from 1991 they were seeking to have their rights to these lands recognised and to have the 
lands demarcated.  
At that point, the Constitution of Nicaragua recognised indigenous communal land 
ownership.447 Still, there was no law establishing an effective process of recognition of 
indigenous collective land rights, and the delimitation,448 demarcation449 and titling450 of these 
lands.451  
 
445 RUIZ CHIRIBOGA, Oswaldo and Gina DONOSO. Jurisprudencia de la Corte IDH sobre los Pueblos 
Indígenas y Tribales. Fondo y Reparaciones. STEINER, Christian and FUCHS, Marie-Christine, ed. Convención 
Americana sobre Derechos Humanos: Comentario. 2nd edn. Bogotá: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V., 2019, p. 
1155. 
446 Awas Tingni, para 152. 
447 Constitución Política de la República de Nicaragua. Adopted 19 November 1986, Articles 89 and 180; Awas 
Tingni, paras 115-147. 
448 Delimitation of lands is the verbal or graphical description of the boundaries of the specific territory. 
449 Demarcation of lands is the formal process of identifying the actual locations and boundaries of indigenous 
lands or territories and physically marking those boundaries on the ground. DAES, Erica-Irene. Indigenous 
people and their relationship to land. ECOSOC, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, 1999, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/18, para 47. 
450  Land titling procedures provide legal descriptions of the nature of the land and resource rights held, in 
accordance with laws and land tenure systems. OECD. OECD Rural Policy Reviews, Linking Indigenous 
Communities with Regional Development. 17 July 2019, Chapter 3. 
451 Awas Tingni, paras 115-147. 
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In 1996, the State awarded a concession to a private company for wood logging in the 
area claimed by the Awas Tingni community. The State considered the lands as state-owned 
and thus did not carry out any consultations with the indigenous community before granting 
the concession.  
The IACtHR held that by not having established a mechanism enabling delimitation, 
demarcation and titling of indigenous peoples’ lands, Nicaragua hindered the possibility of 
this community to enjoy their communal property.  
The Court, therefore, ordered the State to establish a procedure facilitating the 
delimitation, demarcation and issuing of a title deed to the lands of indigenous communities. 
Moreover, this procedure needs to comply with indigenous peoples’ customary law and 
traditions.452 Without such a delimitation, demarcation and titling, indigenous people are 
exposed to a situation of uncertainty over the extent of their rights.453  
According to the Court, a mere abstract legal recognition of property rights without an 
actual delimitation, demarcation and titling lacks any practical purpose.454 Moreover, until the 
delimitation, demarcation and titling procedure is completed, states have to guarantee the 
indigenous community ‘effective ownership’ of the lands. Also, States must abstain from 
undertaking any activity which could have an adverse effect on the claimed territory. States 
further have to ensure that no third party engages in any such activity.455  
However, the mere practical possibility to use and occupy land without legal 
recognition of property rights does not suffice either. The Saramaka v. Suriname case 
addressed this issue.  
The IACtHR ruled that the State must guarantee indigenous peoples both permanent 
ownership and effective control over their lands without any external interference.456 
Suriname does not recognise indigenous communal property rights. It argued that the 
Saramaka people have the possibility of using and occupying their ancestral lands through a 
‘community forests’ permit.  
 
452 Awas Tingni, para 164; Garífuna Triunfo de la Cruz, para 104. 
453 Garífuna Triunfo de la Cruz, para 106. 
454 Awas Tingni, para 164; Garífuna Triunfo de la Cruz, para 104. 
455 Awas Tingni, para 164; Kaliña and Lokono, para 132. 
456 Saramaka, para 115. 
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The IACtHR, however, objected that these permits, which are in fact forestry 
concessions, depend on the discretion of the authority granting them. Also, they are 
revocable. Therefore, they do not guarantee the permanent use and enjoyment of the property 
rights to their lands and do not provide the people with the necessary legal certainty.457 
Another obligation which, according to the IACtHR, accompanies the guarantee of 
indigenous peoples’ property rights is regularisation (saneamiento in Spanish). It consists of 
the remedy of any legal defects of the title, including the discharge of obligations attached to 
the lands. Third parties occupying the territory must be displaced (according to procedures 
established by the law), and any other interference with the peaceful enjoyment of the 
property rights must be removed.458  
This obligation was first mentioned in 2015 in the case of Garífuna de Punta Piedra v. 
Honduras.459 In this case, the Court found support for its findings on the concept of 
regularisation of indigenous peoples’ land rights in the communication of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples addressed to Nicaragua and in the national 
laws of some of the states in the region, in particular Colombia.460  
It is, however, necessary to point out that in his communication, the UN Special 
Rapporteur James Anaya found support for Nicaragua’s obligation of regularisation in 
Nicaraguan national law.461 Subsequently, the Court found that Honduran legislation did not 
incorporate the obligation of the State to carry out regularisation of indigenous communal 
property rights. According to the IACtHR Honduras was obliged to carry out the 
regularisation of the Garífuna de Punta Piedra land rights based on a contract between 
Honduras and the indigenous community.462  
 
457 Saramaka, para 113-115. 
458 Xucuru, para 124.  
459 IACtHR. Case of Garífuna de Punta Piedra y sus Miembros v. Honduras. Judgement of October 8, 2015 
(Garífuna de Punta Piedra), para 181. 
460 Garífuna de Punta Piedra, paras 176 and 178. 
461 UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Communication to Nicaragua of 10 May 2013, 
NIC 1/2013. 
462 Garífuna de Punta Piedra, paras 113, 114 and 180. 
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Finally, the Court concluded that land regularisation was one of many measures a state 
could adopt to comply with its obligation to guarantee indigenous and tribal peoples’ effective 
enjoyment and use of their property rights.463  
When the Court next had to address this positive obligation of a state to ensure and 
protect the peaceful enjoyment of indigenous communal property rights, it substantiated it in a 
more elegant way.  
In the case of Xucuru v. Brazil from 2018, the IACtHR reasoned that regularisation was 
based on the principle of legal certainty. It held that regularisation was one of the States’ 
specific obligations linked with indigenous peoples’ communal property rights alongside 
delimitation, demarcation and titling.464 
These obligations of States towards indigenous communities stemming from the long-
term possession of their ancestral lands, moreover, also apply in cases where the community 
was provided with substitute lands. This follows from the case of Kuna Indigenous People of 
Madungandí and the Emberá Indigenous People of Bayano and their members v. Panama.  
The Kuna de Madungandí and Emberá de Bayano peoples were moved to alternative 
lands because their ancestral lands were to be flooded due to construction of a dam in the 
early 1970s. The State, however, failed to comply with its obligation to title, delimit and 
demarcate these new lands within a reasonable time.465  
Although these obligations of delimitation, demarcation and titling of indigenous 
ancestral lands are conditional on possession over an extended period of time, the IACtHR 
ruled that the State’s obligations attached to the substitute lands have to be the same as those 
which are linked to the ancestral lands. Were it not so, the community would be deprived of 
its rights, even though it was not in its power to possess these new lands for an extended 
period of time.466 
 
463 Garífuna de Punta Piedra, para 181. 
464 Xucuru, paras 120, 126 and 132. 
465 The Court does not mention the obligation of regularization. This obligation was established in the IACtHR’s 
case-law after the delivery of this judgement. 
466 Kuna of Madungandí and Emberá of Bayano, para 120-122. 
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3.2.5 The right to own natural resources 
The IACtHR has also addressed the relationship between lands and resources, because 
of the inextricable connection between them in indigenous peoples’ way of life. It concluded 
that Article 21 covers indigenous peoples’ property rights not only to their lands but also to 
those natural resources which are located on these lands and which indigenous peoples 
traditionally use.  
According to the IACtHR’s judgement in the Yakye Axa v. Paraguay case, some of the 
natural resources on indigenous peoples’ territories are crucial for the maintenance of their 
distinctive culture, traditions, health and medicine, and their overall survival as peoples.467  
In another case, the Court held that indigenous peoples have the right to own the natural 
resources which they have traditionally used for the same reasons that they have the right to 
own their traditionally occupied lands. According to the IACtHR, separating indigenous 
peoples’ rights to their territories from the rights over their natural resources would render the 
protection of their land rights meaningless.468 
3.2.6 The right to restitution of ancestral lands 
In the event that an indigenous or tribal community is deprived of the possibility to 
occupy its ancestral lands to which it has a traditional relationship, even though it may lack a 
real title to these lands, its property rights persist. This follows from the IACtHR’s judgement 
in the Moiwana case.  
The Moiwana tribal community was forced to leave its ancestral lands after a massacre 
carried out by members of the Surinamese armed forces against the community in 1986. 
During the massacre, 40 members of the tribal community were killed, and the whole village 
was demolished. Suriname failed to investigate the events and punish the perpetrators.469 This 
state of impunity made the surviving members of the community fear reoccurrence of the 
events, and therefore they did not intend to return to these lands.470  
The Court held that, even though the tribal community did not own a real title to its 
traditional lands and had not been able to occupy these lands for almost twenty years, it 
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remained the legitimate owner of these lands. The IACtHR reiterated that traditional land 
possession entitles indigenous and tribal peoples to require the recognition of their property 
rights and held that the deprivation of the possibility to occupy these lands does not lead to a 
loss of their claim.471  
An exception to this rule is a case when property rights to ancestral lands have been 
lawfully transferred to third parties in good faith without the indigenous peoples’ consent. In 
such a case, according to the Court, the State is obliged to either return the lands to the 
indigenous community which had traditionally occupied it or substitute it with lands of the 
same extent and quality.472  
3.2.7 Conflict of indigenous peoples’ rights to communal property and private property 
rights 
The deficiencies in states’ guarantee of indigenous peoples’ land rights, including the 
lack of recognition of communal property rights and delays in delimitation, demarcation and 
titling of indigenous lands, bring along additional complications. It is sometimes the case that, 
during the time when indigenous peoples’ property rights were not ensured, these rights were 
also conferred on other persons, often in good faith.  
When there is a conflict between the property rights claim of an indigenous community 
and third parties in good faith, it is up to the State to assess the consequences of one right 
prevailing over the other in each individual case.  
The IACtHR addressed such a situation in 2005 in the Yakye Axa case. The Yakye Axa 
is an indigenous community living in Paraguay whose culture and subsistence is based on 
hunting, fishing, gathering, and farming. At the point of the judgement, it consisted of 
approximately 90 families. Their ancestral lands were sold through the London stock 
exchange to British entrepreneurs at the end of the 19th century and subsequently managed by 
the Anglican church. The members of the indigenous community were employed on these 
lands but received low wages and lived in poor conditions.  
In 1993, the community started the procedure of claiming back their ancestral lands. 
The State acknowledged that these lands (which at that point were owned by various private 
companies) represented part of their ancestral territory. Nevertheless, it did not enable the 
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community to, in fact, own and use them. The State claimed that the lands were ‘under 
rational use’.473  
After ten years of proceedings, expropriation of the lands from their current owners was 
ruled out. The community was offered substitute lands, which it rejected because no 
consultation had preceded the offer.474 
When addressing the Yakye Axa case, the Court first recalled the general rules for 
resolving a situation of two contradicting rights envisaged in Article 21 ACHR and further 
elaborated in the IACtHR’s case-law; each restriction must be established by law, it must be 
necessary and proportional, and it must follow a legitimate aim in a democratic society.475 
Subsequently, it pointed out that when weighing the private rights against indigenous 
peoples’ rights in each particular situation, the State needs to take into consideration the role 
which ancestral lands play for the collective survival of indigenous communities as a people 
and the preservation of their culture.476 The failure to protect indigenous peoples’ communal 
property rights could result in a violation of other human rights of these communities and 
their members, including their right to life and the preservation of their culture.  
The preservation of indigenous cultures can, according to the Court, represent a 
legitimate aim in a pluralist democratic society. Moreover, the restriction of private property 
rights may be necessary for the attainment of this aim. Additionally, payment of fair 
compensation to the affected individuals may make such a restriction proportional.  
The IACtHR also clarified that this does not imply that indigenous peoples’ rights 
always prevail. According to the Court, ‘for concrete and justified reasons,’ it is sometimes 
not possible to return traditional lands to indigenous peoples. Where this is the case, the 
compensation, be it in money, in kind, or in the form of alternative lands, must be based on all 
that these ancestral lands represent for indigenous peoples.477  
As to the form of the compensation, the Court based its findings on Article 16(4) of ILO 
Convention 169 (ratified by Paraguay in October 1993), which addresses the right of 
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indigenous peoples to return to their ancestral lands. The IACtHR found that it does not 
depend solely on the State to determine the form of compensation. The State must consult the 
respective indigenous peoples according to their own procedures and reach a consensus on the 
selection of alternative lands or monetary compensation or both.478  
The Court subsequently reiterated this position in the case of Sawahoyamaxa v. 
Paraguay479 and the Xákmok Kásek v. Paraguay.480 In the Yakye Axa case, Paraguay did not 
make it possible for indigenous peoples to return their ancestral lands, nor did it reach a 
consensus on compensation. Therefore, the Court declared a violation of Article 21 ACHR. 
3.2.8 Guarantees in case of an interference with indigenous peoples’ rights to 
traditionally used natural resources 
The property rights of private persons in good faith are only one instance of interference 
with indigenous peoples’ land rights. Indigenous peoples are often affected by projects of 
exploration and exploitation of natural resources on their territories, such as the construction 
of water dams, wood logging or gold mining.  
This was also the case in Saramaka v. Suriname, where Suriname granted concessions 
for gold mining and timber logging within the territory claimed by the Saramaka tribal people 
without consulting them.  
As has previously been pointed out, indigenous peoples have the right to own those 
natural resources which they have traditionally used as a part of their culture and which are 
necessary for their survival. Nevertheless, exploration and exploitation of even those natural 
resources which indigenous peoples do not traditionally use may indirectly affect those 
resources which they do. 
In Saramaka v. Suriname, the Court dealt with the question of the interconnectedness of 
natural resources traditionally used by indigenous peoples and those not traditionally used. It 
pointed out that it is very probable that the extraction of natural resources which are not 
traditionally used by indigenous peoples will also affect those resources which are necessary 
for indigenous peoples’ survival. It used the example of clean natural water, where cleanliness 
relates to the number of fish living in it. The Saramakas catch fish as a means of subsistence. 
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Thus, when the cleanliness of water is affected by extraction activities, it will also impact the 
Saramakas’ means of subsistence.  
According to the IACtHR, it cannot be concluded that the State must not grant any 
concessions for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources in indigenous peoples’ 
territories, as the right enshrined in Article 21 is not absolute. Therefore, the IACtHR at first 
resorted to the conditions already mentioned in the Yakye Axa case concerning the restriction 
of property rights (legality, necessity, proportionality, and a legitimate aim).  
It also found that such a restriction of indigenous peoples’ communal property rights 
may not endanger the survival of the indigenous or tribal group or its members.481 The Court 
elaborated a list of safeguards which states need to follow in order to ensure the survival of an 
indigenous community and the preservation of its customs and traditions in the event that its 
property rights are restricted in the context of exploration of natural resources.  
According to the Court, prior to the granting of any concessions within the territory of 
indigenous peoples, the State is obliged to ensure: 
1) effective participation of indigenous peoples according to their customs and 
traditions in the creation of any development plans,  
2) environmental and social impact assessment carried out by independent and 
technically capable entities and under the State’s supervision, and 
3) a reasonable benefit to these peoples from the relevant project.482 
3.2.8.1 Right to effective participation: free, prior and informed consent through 
consultation, or consultation alone 
The right to the effective participation of indigenous peoples regarding measures which 
may affect them – such as the exploration and extraction of natural resources on their 
territories – is one of the most contentious issues within the topic of indigenous peoples’ land 
rights. It is linked to many questions. What role do indigenous peoples play in decision-
making over development plans which may affect their territories? When do they need to be 
consulted? Can the State let a private entity consult on its behalf?  
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The IACtHR has addressed the conditions and goals of consultation in various cases. In 
the case of Saramaka v. Suriname, the Court concluded that a state which plans to grant 
concessions for a development project on indigenous peoples’ territories always has the 
positive obligation of consultation of indigenous peoples. It has to do so in good faith and 
with the aim of reaching an agreement.483 After all, the consultations should serve as a real 
tool for participation and should establish a dialogue between the parties.484  
In the case of Garífuna Triunfo de la Cruz v. Honduras, the Court determined that the 
indigenous peoples concerned need to be included in the early stages of the planning of the 
project, so that they have a real chance of influencing it.485 
In Sarayaku v. Ecuador, the Court specified that it is the State that is ultimately 
responsible for carrying out the consultations. The IACtHR relied in its findings on the Report 
of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous people, James Anaya.486  
Moreover, the State may not entrust the consultations to a third party – the Court 
specifically excluded their delegation to a company which has an interest in the resources in 
the territory.487 Anaya points out in one of his later works that, on the one hand, it is the State 
that is ultimately responsible for complying with all the requirements for the consultations. 
On the other hand, subject to further conditions, ‘direct negotiations between the business 
enterprise and indigenous peoples may enhance efficiency and also be desirable’. Anaya 
moreover calls attention to the need for mitigation of power imbalances between the peoples 
concerned, the state agencies and private companies.488  
In Saramaka, the Court also concluded that the State must provide the community with 
all the necessary information regarding environmental and health impacts to ensure that their 
decision is informed and voluntary. The consultations must be carried out according to the 
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traditional decision-making methods of the peoples concerned.489 In Sarayaku v. Ecuador, it 
affirmed that the burden of proof for showing that consultations complied with all the 
requirements falls on the State.490 
In the Saramaka case, the Court made a substantial – and controversial – leap forward 
in its case-law on this issue. It concluded that where an extensive project may have a 
profound impact on the property rights of the community and affect a large part of its 
territory, the State is not only obliged to consult the community but also receive their free, 
prior and informed consent.491  
The Court based its decision on two documents – the Report of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, 
Rodolfo Stavenhagen,492 and the CERD Concluding observations on Ecuador.493  
In its concluding observations, the CERD observed ‘that merely consulting these 
communities prior to exploiting the resources falls short of meeting the requirements set out 
in the Committee’s general recommendation XXIII on the rights of indigenous peoples’, and it 
recommended that ‘the prior informed consent of these communities be sought (…).’494 The 
General Recommendation mentioned requires that ‘no decisions directly relating to their 
[indigenous peoples’] rights and interests are taken without their informed consent’.495 
Thornberry argues that this wording of the Committee gives indigenous peoples the right to a 
veto in the case of decisions which directly affect them.496 
On the other hand, the newest binding instrument addressing this issue is ILO 
Convention 169. The Convention does not include the obligation to obtain consent.497 The 
questions of consultation and consent posed a considerable hurdle throughout its 
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negotiations.498 Eventually, due to many states’ resistance, the obligation of consent was not 
included in the instrument as a conditio sine qua non.499  
While mentioning the Saramaka decision, Anaya observes in his Report that ‘the 
principles of consultation and consent are aimed at avoiding the imposition of the will of one 
party over the other’.500 According to Anaya, the States’ obligation of consultation responds 
to historical patterns when states would impose decisions on indigenous peoples without any 
regard as to how these decisions would affect them, at times threatening their very survival. 
On the other hand, it also should not lead to indigenous peoples’ unilaterally preventing a 
state from carrying out actions with a legitimate aim in the public interest.501  
In the subsequent Sarayaku case, the Court concluded that Ecuador had violated the 
right to property of the Sarayaku people because it had failed to consult them before a private 
company carried out exploration activities, placed 1500 kg of explosives (prone to activation 
and detonation),502 and damaged their cultural sites on their territory.503  
Not even the most progressive soft-law instrument in this field, the UNDRIP, enshrines 
the right to a veto of measures which may affect indigenous peoples. It does enshrine this 
right with respect to the relocation of indigenous peoples and placing of hazardous materials 
on their territories. But that was not the case in the Saramaka. For the granting of 
concessions, the UNDRIP envisages consultations with the aim of obtaining a free, prior and 
informed consent. The UNDRIP formulates this obligation as one of process, rather than of 
result. 
It thus seems, considering the current state of international law in this area, that the 
Saramaka decision may have gone a step too far in its progressiveness. 
The IACtHR did not reaffirm its findings from the Saramaka on free, prior and 
informed consent in the Sarayaku case.504 Nor has it done so in any further cases concerning 
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the issue of free, prior and informed consultation or consent. In all its subsequent cases, the 
Court solely addressed the obligation of consultation.505 Whether that was due to the 
individual particularities of the cases or because the Court changed its position on the scope 
of this obligation remains to be clarified. 
3.2.8.2 Right to an environmental and social impact assessment 
The State is obliged to ensure an environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA), 
in order to guarantee that any development project carried out on indigenous peoples’ 
territories does not threaten their survival as a people. The term ‘survival’ does not entail their 
mere physical survival, but also the protection and preservation of their traditional 
relationship with their territory, their distinct culture, customs, traditions, as well as their 
social and economic system.506  
The ESIA needs to be carried out prior to granting any concessions for such projects by 
technically competent entities, under the State’s supervision. They must also follow relevant 
international standards and best practices. The ESIA should not only consider the impact of 
an individual project in question but should also assess the cumulative impact of all existing 
and proposed projects. Also, it must respect the peoples’ traditions and culture.507 
Part of the reason why such an assessment needs to be conducted is to provide the 
indigenous peoples concerned with all the necessary information about the potential impact 
which the project in question may have.508 It, therefore, forms a precondition for the 
community’s effective participation in the consultations.509  
3.2.8.3 Right to benefit-sharing 
Benefit-sharing is one of the safeguards to preserve indigenous peoples’ rights. 
Indigenous peoples have the right to a share of the benefits made as a result of the projects 
which led to the restriction of their rights.  
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The IACtHR considers this to be a form of the right to compensation established in 
Article 21, paragraph 2 ACHR. In the Saramaka case, the Court found support for this 
interpretation in ILO Convention 169,510 as well as in the UNDRIP.511 It concluded, that the 
fact that the members of the Saramaka people had not received any benefit from the timber 
logging in their territory formed part of the violation of Article 21.512  
 
Conclusion 
What are the instruments of international law anchoring indigenous peoples’ land rights 
in the region of Latin America?  
  Indigenous peoples’ land rights find support in various instruments of international 
law both within the global human rights system and within the IASHR. On the global level, 
two international conventions address this topic specifically – ILO Convention 107 and ILO 
Convention 169 which aimed to replace it (but remains valid for those state parties which did 
not ratify ILO Convention 169). As of 2007, there is also an essential instrument of soft law – 
the UNDRIP. 
 There are also various other instruments which apply globally and provide protection 
to indigenous peoples’ land rights despite no specifically mentioning them. Mostly, it is on 
the basis of economic, social, cultural and environmental rights. Among these instruments are 
the ICCPR, ICESCR, ICERD, DRM, CRC and CBD. 
 Because all Latin American States are member states of the OAS, the instruments of 
the IASHR bear great relevance to the land rights of indigenous peoples in the region. In 
2016, the OAS adopted its own declaration anchoring the rights of indigenous peoples within 
the region of the Americas – the ADRIP. This soft-law instrument also contains various 
provisions which specifically deal with indigenous peoples’ land rights.  
 Moreover, there are two instruments which do not contain any mention of indigenous 
peoples but cannot be omitted. Firstly, the ADRDM bears special importance for States which 
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are not a party to the ACHR. Secondly, an essential instrument in this field and region is the 
ACHR. Its crucial value lies in its binding character and the monitoring role of the IACtHR. 
Between the first and most recent, how have the instruments specifically addressing 
indigenous peoples’ land rights developed?  
The oldest binding instrument is ILO Convention 107. This Convention was revised and 
reworked into ILO Convention 169 because of its assimilationist and paternalistic 
approach.513 ILO Convention 169 made a significant leap forward with respect to its 
predecessor. Throughout its negotiations, however, many compromises had to be made.  
It included representatives of indigenous peoples in the works on the new Convention514 
and rejected the integrationist views of its forerunner. It abandons the term ‘populations’ and 
uses ‘peoples’ instead. However, it removes the international legal dimension of this word.515 
Also, it anchors the right of indigenous peoples to set their own priorities with respect to their 
own matters – the internal part of the right to self-determination. However, it does not 
explicitly mention this right.  
The Convention newly enshrines the general obligation of States to consult indigenous 
peoples in good faith when measures are being adopted, which may directly affect them. The 
objective of these consultations must be consent.  
It further anchors the States’ obligation to respect indigenous peoples’ collective 
relationship with their lands. Also, it requires that States recognise indigenous peoples’ 
collective property rights and possession of lands.516 As opposed to ILO Convention 107, it 
leaves out the option of the recognition of individual property rights. This way, the States 
cannot choose to only recognise individual property rights. 
The Convention also made some progress with respect to the removal of indigenous 
peoples from their lands. It still allows for the relocation of indigenous peoples from their 
lands without their free, prior and informed consent. Nevertheless, only in so far as the 
 
513 GILBERT, Jérémie. Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors. 
Netherlands: Brill | Nijhoff, 2007, p. 182. 
514 SWEPSTON, Lee. A New Step in the International Law on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: ILO Convention 
No. 169 of 1989. Oklahoma City University Law Review. 1990, 15(3), p. 685. 
515 ILO Convention 169, Article 1 (3). 
516 ILO Convention 169, Articles 13-14. 
 97 
grounds for such relocation still exist. Once they do not, indigenous peoples have the right to 
return.517  
ILO Convention 169 significantly advanced the protection of indigenous peoples’ land 
rights by anchoring their rights to natural resources. Its predecessor does not contain a single 
provision on this issue. However, it does not explicitly enshrine the right to own these 
resources.518  
As concerns exploitation and exploration of these resources, States must consult 
indigenous peoples prior to putting any such projects in place. However, the Convention does 
not mention the obligation of aiming for consent. It newly contains the right of indigenous 
peoples to a share of the benefits from such projects.519 
From a current point of view, especially after the adoption of the UNDRIP, the 
Convention may seem only mildly progressive. However, it should be noted that its point of 
reference was an assimilationist instrument which viewed indigenous cultures as being ‘at a 
less advanced stage than the stage reached by the other sections of the national 
community’.520 Thus, adoption of an instrument which embraces cultural diversity and 
comprises mainly collective rights constitutes a major step forward. 
As a binding instrument, it moreover serves as a strong tool for both national521 and 
international522  judicial protection of indigenous peoples’ land rights in Latin America where 
it enjoys a high number of ratifications. Also, it provided a firm point of reference for the 
adoption of significantly more progressive soft-law instruments, such as the aforementioned 
UNDRIP, adoption of which followed. 
The UNDRIP anchors the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination already in 
the Preamble, making it one of its guiding principles. It also reiterates it in its operative text. 
Nevertheless, it contains a provision which restricts the external aspect of the right to self-
determination, preventing it from having any effect on the territorial integrity of States.  
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As was pointed out by indigenous peoples during the negotiations of the instrument, this 
provision seems discriminatory.523 It attempts to exclude indigenous peoples from being 
subjects of the right to self-determination in its full range, including its external aspect, 
pertaining to ‘all peoples’.524  
As the right to self-determination is not the primary focus of this paper, it does not 
provide answers to the questions which arise as to the effects of this restrictive provisions on 
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination. However, it would certainly be a fruitful topic 
for follow-up research. Especially due to the link between the right to self-determination and 
indigenous peoples’ rights to lands and natural resources mentioned in section 2.1.1.2. 
The UNDRIP incorporates the standards which had been established by ILO 
Convention 169. In addition, it introduces a number of provisions which are significantly 
more favourable to indigenous peoples’ land rights than any previous instrument of 
international law.  
The UNDRIP newly anchors the right of indigenous peoples to own natural resources 
which they traditionally use.525 Furthermore, the Declaration acknowledges indigenous 
peoples’ traditional forms of tenure of their lands, territories and resources and requires States 
to recognise them.526 
Moreover, when hazardous materials are to be placed in indigenous peoples’ territories, 
the UNDRIP requires States not only to consult them but also to obtain their free, prior and 
informed consent. The same requirement is attached to the relocation of indigenous peoples 
from their territories.527  
In other cases, such as planning of development projects, the UNDRIP requires States to 
carry out consultations with indigenous peoples with the aim of obtaining their free, prior and 
informed consent.528 
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The UNDRIP facilitated the progress of the protection of indigenous peoples’ land 
rights on the international level. Both through its negotiations which contributed to the 
mobilisation indigenous peoples all around the globe529 and through its progressive content 
which quickly found its way into the decisions of international human rights bodies.530  
In 2016, a soft-law declaration was adopted in the region of the Americas – the ADRIP. 
The ADRIP incorporates the right to self-determination in the same restricted form as the 
UNDRIP. Also, this right is not mentioned in its Preamble. As opposed to the UNDRIP, it 
thus does not make this right its core principle.531 Moreover, the restricting provision is not 
placed at the end of the Declaration, as is the case in the UNDRIP. It directly follows after the 
provision anchoring the right itself. 
The American Declaration moreover contains an integrationist provision emphasising 
that indigenous peoples are a part of the national societies. In contrast, the UNDRIP enshrines 
indigenous peoples’ right to live as distinct peoples.532 
As has been mentioned above, the UNDRIP requires States to obtain indigenous 
peoples’ consent in the event of their relocation from their ancestral land or placing of 
dangerous materials on these lands. The ADRIP, on the other hand, does not require such 
consent533 and does not incorporate provisions on indigenous peoples’ relocation at all. Also, 
it does not follow the UNDRIP in incorporating indigenous peoples’ right to restitution of 
lands owned in the past and taken away without their free, prior and informed consent. 
Furthermore, the ADRIP envisages that indigenous peoples’ forms of land ownership 
comply with national laws in order for States to be obliged to recognise these their property 
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rights. This provision is a step backwards compared to both the UNDRIP and IACtHR’s case 
law.534 
In this way, the American Declaration fell short of its potential emanating from the 
standards which had been already established both globally and in the region of Latin 
America.  
On the other hand, it contains a few provisions which do constitute an advancement of 
the current standards in the region.535 It enshrines indigenous peoples’ right to health as both 
collective and individual, rather than just individual, which is the case in the UNDRIP.536 This 
provision may bear relevance, for example, in the event that the health of the entire 
community is affected by some external factors, such as the exploitation of natural resources. 
Moreover, the ADRIP incorporates a progressive provision on treaties between 
indigenous peoples and States. It foresees the possibility of submitting conflicts arising under 
these treaties also to international bodies.537 It further enshrines the protection of indigenous 
peoples in voluntary isolation and also during an armed conflict.538 
The last two articles of the ADRIP are of essential importance. They stipulate that 
nothing in the ADRIP may lower neither the already existing nor future standards of 
protection of indigenous peoples’ rights.539  
Due to this provision, considering that the UNDRIP offers in many ways a higher 
standard of protection, the fact that the ADRIP is regressive, should not diminish indigenous 
peoples’ rights which they already have under the UNDRIP.  
 
534 Awas Tingni, paras 151 and 164; YÁÑEZ FUENZALIDA, Nancy. Analysis: OAS’s American Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [online]. Copenhagen: IWGIA, 2016 (accessed on 20 April 2020). Available at: 
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the-rights-o&catid=150; BLANCO, Cristina. Declaración Americana sobre los Derechos de los Pueblos 
Indígenas: Breve balance de un esperado documento [online]. Instituto de democracia y derechos humanos, 
2016 (accessed on 24 April 2020). Available at: https://idehpucp.pucp.edu.pe/opinion/declaracion-americana-
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2016 (accessed on 10 May 2020). Available at: https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/organizacion-de-los-
estados-americanos-aprobo-la-declaracion-americana-sobre-los-derechos-de. 
536 ADRIP, Article XVIII. 
537 ADRIP, Article XXIV. 
538 ADRIP, Articles XXVI., XXX. 
539 ADRIP, Article XL. 
 101 
This goes in line with the argumentation of the IACtHR which may not interpret the 
ACHR in a way, which would be more restrictive than under any other instrument which 
applies in the relevant case.540 Therefore in the event that the IACtHR has both of these 
instruments before it, it will possibly interpret the ACHR in light of that instrument which 
offers higher protection.  
Based on the foregoing, it can be assumed that those provisions of the ADRIP which 
constitute a step forward in the protection of indigenous peoples’ land rights are significantly 
more important than those which constitute a step back. 
What specific rights of indigenous peoples and relevant obligations of States concerning 
indigenous peoples’ traditional lands stem from the jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights under Article 21 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights? 
The IACtHR delivered its first judgement on indigenous peoples’ rights – in the case of 
Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua – in 2001. Since then, it has ruled on twelve more cases concerning 
indigenous peoples’ land rights.541 As a result, it has produced a detailed set jurisprudence 
elaborating the rights and obligations under Article 21 ACHR (right to property) with respect 
to indigenous peoples’ lands.  
In its jurisprudence, the Court has established the following: 
1) Article 21 of the ACHR protects not only private property rights but also indigenous 
and tribal peoples’ communal property rights, including their distinctive spiritual relationship 
with their lands. It moreover also applies to the natural resources which indigenous peoples 
traditionally use.  
2) Traditional possession of their ancestral lands without a formal title entitles 
indigenous peoples to obtain a real title to these lands.  
3) Where indigenous peoples have been deprived of the possibility to occupy their 
ancestral lands, their claim to these lands persists.  
 
540 Yakye Axa, paras 127-130. 
541 By the end of 2019, the Court had decided 290 cases in total. See IACtHR. Annual Report 2019, p. 59. Out of 
these cases 12 concerned indigenous peoples’ land rights. 
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4) However, when these lands have been transferred to third persons in good faith, it is 
up to the State to assess which right prevails. When balancing the two claims, the State must 
nevertheless take into account the special spiritual relationship of indigenous peoples with 
these lands. Moreover, such a restriction on a property right must comply with the general 
conditions of legality, necessity, proportionality and the pursuit of a legitimate aim. 
Additionally, any restriction of indigenous peoples’ communal property rights must not 
endanger their survival as a people. 
5) Also, where there is a good reason that ancestral lands cannot be returned to 
indigenous peoples, their relationship to these lands needs to be taken into account when 
assessing the form and amount of compensation. The compensation must, moreover, be 
agreed upon with the indigenous peoples concerned.  
6) The Court has further specified a set of obligations related to indigenous communal 
property rights. The mere formal legal recognition of collective property rights does not 
suffice – indigenous peoples must be able to effectively control their lands. Moreover, the 
sole possibility of use of these lands does not suffice either – indigenous peoples have the 
right to legal certainty over permanent ownership of these lands. To comply with all these 
obligations, States must delimit and demarcate indigenous lands and must issue a title deed. 
Moreover, states must rid these lands of any legal defects, i.e. carry out their 
regularisation.542 Those same obligations also apply to alternative lands provided to 
indigenous peoples as compensation. 
7) Where the State is planning to grant concessions for projects of exploration or 
exploitation of the natural resources on the indigenous peoples’ territory, it always has to 
comply with the following set of safeguards to ensure that the projects do not endanger their 
survival as a people. It has to:  
• supervise a cumulative ESIA of all existing and potential projects prior to 
granting any concessions;  
• provide the indigenous peoples with all necessary information regarding the 
potential impact of the project on their territory; 
 
542 For more specific information in chronological order, see Annexe. 
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• carry out consultations in good faith with the indigenous people concerned from 
the early stages of the planning of the project, according to their customs with 
the aim of attaining their free, prior and informed consent; and 
• if such a project is launched, ensure that the peoples concerned receive a part of 
the benefits realised through the project, as a form of compensation for the 
adverse effects which it has on their territory. 
The question of consultation in order to obtain a free, prior, and informed consent does 
not seem to have been fully resolved yet. It remains unclear, whether in some cases the State 
has an obligation to in fact obtain a free, prior and informed consent, or whether the 
obligation is always one of process. Hopefully, further developments of international law will 
cast more light on the issue. 
The legal framework of protection of indigenous peoples’ land rights is gradually 
becoming more comprehensive, and the standards, which it encompasses, are continually 
being raised. Strong international human rights standards are, however, only the first – albeit 
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IACtHR case-law on Article 21 of the ACHR related to indigenous peoples’ 
land rights 
 
 Case Year Violation New findings of the IACtHR 





2001 -  - Communal property rights 
fall under the scope of 
protection under Article 21 
ACHR (para 148). 
- Traditional possession of 
lands by indigenous 
peoples without a real title 
entitles them to require 
recognition of their 
property rights and issuing 
of a title (para 151). 
- Measures necessary for 
ensuring the property rights 
of indigenous communities 
are delimitation, 
demarcation and titling 
(para 164). 




- Article 21 
- Article 25 
- The Court set out the 
conditions for weighing 
private property rights and 
indigenous communal 
property rights (para 144). 
- When the State is not able 
to return the ancestral lands 
to the indigenous people, it 
 XIV 
must offer compensation in 
the form of alternative 
lands or monetary 
compensation, depending 
on an agreement with the 
indigenous community 
reached through 
consultations according to 
the community’s customs 






-  - The first IACtHR’s ruling 
regarding indigenous and 
tribal peoples’ communal 
property rights based solely 
on the ACHR (paras 124-
134) and no other 
international agreements or 
national law.  
- The tribal community did 
not lose their claim to their 
ancestral lands despite not 
having a real title to these 
lands and having been 
deprived of the possibility 
to occupy these lands for 
20 years (paras 133-134). 
3 Sawhoyamaxa 
v. Paraguay 
2006 - Article 21 
- Article 25 
- Where the lands have been 
transferred to third parties 
in good faith, the 
indigenous community has 
the right to restitution or 
substitute lands (paras 128, 
 XV 
135). 
4 Saramaka v. 
Suriname 
2007 -  - The State must guarantee 
indigenous peoples 
ownership and effective 
control over their lands 
without any external 
interference (para 115). 
- Indigenous peoples have 
the right to own 
traditionally used natural 
resources. 
- Guarantees with which the 
State has to comply with 
respect to exploration and 
exploitation projects: a) 
effective participation of 
members of Saramaka b) 
reasonable benefit of the 
members of Saramaka c) 
environmental and social 
impact assessment before 
any permission is granted 
(para 129). 
- Free, prior and informed 
consent is required in the 
case of profound impact on 
property rights (para 137). 
- The IACtHR cited the ILO 
169 although Suriname is 
not a member of the ILO 
169 (para 130). 
- The IACtHR cited the 
UNDRIP (para 131). 
 XVI 
5 Xákmok Kásek 
v. Paraguay 
2010 - Article 21 
- Article 25 
- When lands have been 
transferred to third parties, 
indigenous peoples have 
the right to either 
restitution or substitution 
by land of the same extent 
and quality (para 109). 
- Article 21 also applies to 
nomadic peoples’ 
communal property rights. 
6 Kichwa de 
Sarayaku vs. 
Ecuador 
2012 -  - Lack of access to their 
natural resources may 
prevent them from 
following their traditional 
health practices, and may 
lead to subhuman living 
conditions, epidemics, 
situations of vulnerability 
and may result in a 
violation of various other 
human rights (para 147). 
- It must be the State who 
carries out the 
consultations; it may not 
entrust it with a third party 
(para 187). 





2014 -  - When the return of 
ancestral lands is not 
possible, the obligations of 
the State towards the 
indigenous community 
(e.g. guarantee of effective 
use) apply to alternative 
 XVII 
lands (para 122). 
- The Court reiterated the 
importance of collective 
ownership falling under the 
scope of Article 21 (paras 
112-13). 
8 Garífuna de 




-  - The Court mentioned 
regularisation for the first 
time (in Spanish 
saneamiento) as a means of 
guaranteeing the effective 
use and control of 
indigenous peoples over 
their lands. Regularisation 
consists of the process of 
removal of any type of 3rd 
party interference in the 
indigenous peoples’ 
territory (para 181). 
9 Garífuna 





-  - The Court applied the 
standards which it had 
developed in the case of 
Saramaka v. Suriname for 
the free, prior and informed 
consultations required 
where development plans 
may affect indigenous 
territories (paras 167, 171, 
179 and 182). 




-  - Indigenous peoples may 
play an essential role in 
nature conservation (para 
 XVIII 
173). 
12 Xucuru people 
v. Brazil 
2018 -  - The Court listed 
regularisation as an 
obligation of States to 
ensure indigenous peoples 
communal property rights 
(alongside delimitation, 
demarcation and titling) 
(paras 120, 124, 126 and 
132). 
13 Asociación 
Lhaka Honhat v. 
Argentina 
2020 -  - The Court found that the 
lack of the possibility of the 
indigenous community to 
determine the development 
of their territory led to the 
violation of their right to 
take part in cultural life and 
their rights to cultural 
identity, a healthy 
environment, adequate 




Landmark instruments of international law concerning indigenous peoples’ 






Abstract in Czech 
Právo domorodých národů v Latinské Americe k půdě 
Pro mnohé domorodé národy a jejich kultury je typický jejich kolektivní, duchovní vztah 
k půdě, který přechází z generace na generaci. Domorodé národy na svých územích mnohdy 
závisí nejen ekonomicky, ale také svou kulturně. Právě s půdou však souvisí také rozsáhlé 
porušování jejich lidských práv. Tradiční území domorodých národů jsou často zabírána a 
ekosystémy, které k těmto územím patří, jsou narušovány. To vede k zásahu do tradičního 
způsobu života těchto národů a k vymizení jejich původních kultur. Od osmdesátých let 
minulého století však domorodé národy postupně posilují své postavení, a to i na 
mezinárodněprávní úrovni. V roce 1989 byla přijata Úmluva Mezinárodní organizace práce č. 
169, Úmluva o domorodých a kmenových národech v nezávislých zemích. Tato Úmluva 
zakotvila podstatně vyšší standardy ochrany práv domorodých národů k jejich územím. 
Zejména opustila patriarchální přístup starší Úmluvy, která se tomuto tématu věnuje – 
Úmluvy Mezinárodní organizace práce č. 107, Úmluvy o ochraně a integraci domorodého a 
ostatního kmenového a polokmenového obyvatelstva v nezávislých zemích. Úmluva č. 169 
navíc označuje domorodé národy za „národy“ a nikoli za „obyvatelstvo“, jak tomu bylo u její 
starší verze. Tato Úmluva tak otevřela dveře dalším mezinárodním instrumentům, které práva 
domorodých národů posouvají zase o krok dál. Jedná se především o Deklaraci OSN o 
právech domorodých národů z roku 2007 a také Americkou deklaraci o právech domorodých 
národů z roku 2016. Tyto instrumenty již uznávají – ačkoli v omezené míře – také právo 
domorodých národů na sebeurčení. Toto právo sice dle mezinárodního práva náleží všem 
národům, ale domorodým národům bylo ještě donedávna upíráno. Přijetí Americké deklarace 
o právech domorodých národů vypovídá o zásadním odhodlání Latinské Ameriky zvýšit 
úroveň ochrany práv domorodých národů k jejich územím. O tomto trendu vypovídá také 
judikatura Inter-amerického soudu pro lidská práva za posledních dvacet let. V roce 2001 
vydal tento soud první rozhodnutí zabývající se vlastnickým právem domorodých národů 
k půdě. Bylo to v případu Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni proti Nicaragui. Soud v rozsudku 
vyložil článek 21 Americké úmluvy o ochraně lidských práv zakotvující právo na ochranu 
soukromého vlastnictví. Rozhodl, že tento článek poskytuje ochranu rovněž kolektivnímu 
vlastnictví typickému pro domorodé národy. Z judikatury soudu v současné době vyplývá již 
celá řada dalších práv, jež se z vlastnického práva odvíjí. Státy mají povinnost uznat tradiční 
držbu půdy domorodými národy za vlastnický titul. Dle Saramaka proti Surinamu navíc pod 
vlastnické právo k půdě spadají rovněž přírodní zdroje, které domorodý národ tradičně užívá. 
 XXI 
V případu Yakye Axa proti Paraguayi Inter-americký soud řešil kolizi nároků domorodých 
národů a soukromého vlastnického práva. V nejnovějším rozhodnutí, v případu Asociación 
Lhaka Honhat proti Argentině, pak Soud shledal porušení práva na vodu, dostatečnou výživu, 
účastnit se kulturního života a na zdravé životní prostředí jako důsledek porušení právě práva 
na ochranu vlastnictví půdy domorodých národů. 
Klíčová slova 
Domorodé národy, právo k půdě, vlastnické právo 
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Abstract in English 
Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights in Latin America 
Indigenous peoples’ cultures are known for their collective, spiritual, intergenerational 
relationship to their ancestral lands. Indigenous peoples not only depend on their territories 
with their subsistence but also with the preservation of their distinct cultures. Lands are, 
however, a significant factor in the vast human rights violations to which they subject. They 
are often faced with the dispossession of their traditional lands and the disruption of the 
ecological integrity of their territories. This also affects their traditional way of life and leads 
to the loss of their cultures. From the 1980s, indigenous peoples have started reclaiming their 
rights, which has also been reflected in their position under international law. In 1989, the 
International Labour Organisation Convention No. 169, the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention was adopted. This Convention anchored significantly higher standards of 
protection of indigenous peoples’ rights to their lands. Above all, it abandoned the patriarchal 
approach of the International Labour Organisation’s Convention No. 107, the Indigenous and 
Tribal Populations Convention. Convention No. 169, moreover, addresses indigenous peoples 
as ‘peoples’ rather than ‘populations’, as was the case in its predecessor. This Convention laid 
firm foundations for instruments to follow, which advanced indigenous peoples’ rights under 
international law even more. Namely, it was the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples adopted in 2007 and the American Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples from 2016. These instruments recognise – albeit not in its full extent – 
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination. Under international law, this right pertains to 
all peoples. Nevertheless, until recently, indigenous peoples were not recognised as its 
subject. The adoption of the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
signals the commitment of Latin America to increase the level of protection of indigenous 
peoples’ rights to their lands in the region. This trend can also be observed in the case-law of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In 2001, the Inter-American Court for Human 
Rights delivered its first judgement concerning indigenous peoples’ land rights. It was in the 
case of Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua. In its judgement, the Court ruled that 
Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights (enshrining the right to private 
property) also covers indigenous peoples’ communal property rights. Since then, the Court 
has elaborated a complex body of rights of indigenous peoples which stem from the right to 
property. States are obliged to recognise indigenous peoples’ traditional possession of lands 
as a real title. It follows from the Saramaka v. Suriname that indigenous peoples not only 
 XXIII 
have the right to lands but also to their traditionally used resources. In Yakye Axa v. 
Paraguay, the Court addressed the conflict between indigenous peoples’ claim to their 
traditional lands and private property rights. In its most recent judgement in the case 
of Asociación Lhaka Honhat v. Argentina, the Court linked the violation of state’s obligations 
concerning indigenous peoples’ land rights under the right to property to the violation of the 
right to water, adequate food, healthy environment and to take part in cultural life. 
Keywords 
Indigenous peoples, land rights, right to property 
 
